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IWMI’s mission is to improve water and land resources management for food,
livelihoods and nature. In serving this mission, IWMI concentrates on the integration
of policies, technologies and management systems to achieve workable solutions to
real problems—practical, relevant results in the field of irrigation and water and land
resources.
The publications in this series cover a wide range of subjects—from computer
modeling to experience with water user associations—and vary in content from
directly applicable research to more basic studies, on which applied work ultimately
depends. Some research reports are narrowly focused, analytical and detailed
empirical studies; others are wide-ranging and synthetic overviews of generic
problems.
Although most of the reports are published by IWMI staff and their collaborators,
we welcome contributions from others. Each report is reviewed internally by IWMI’s
own staff and Fellows, and by external reviewers. The reports are published and
distributed both in hard copy and electronically (www.iwmi.org) and where possible all
data and analyses will be available as separate downloadable files. Reports may be
copied freely and cited with due acknowledgment.i i
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Summary Summary Summary Summary Summary
The total investment in the irrigation sector of Sri
Lanka, during the period of a decade and a half
from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s, declined
drastically to one seventh of its peak level in the
early 1980s due a drop in public irrigation
investments. Of the three types of public
investment, new irrigation construction recorded
the sharpest decline. Although the percentage for
rehabilitation in the total irrigation investment
increased, its absolute amount declined from the
mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. The operation and
maintenance (O&M) expenditure remained stagnant
in the last two decades, and has declined since
the mid-1980s. For the total irrigated area, which
increased by 10 percent (50,000 ha) during this
period, O&M expenditure per hectare declined
considerably.
The total irrigation investment in the last half
decade, showed a slight upward trend from its
rock bottom level in the early 1990s. However, the
relative composition of investment was entirely
different from what it was before the early 1990s.
Investment on rehabilitation increased and
constituted the largest share in the total irrigation
investment for the first time while investment in
new irrigation construction continued to shrink.
Also remarkable is the rapid increase in
private irrigation investment. The investment on
agro-wells and irrigation pumps by farmers was
negligible until the end of the 1980s, but increased
rapidly in the 1990s, exceeding the O&M
expenditure for the entire major irrigation schemes
by a wide margin.
The rapid decline in new irrigation construction,
which resulted from the drastic decline in its
profitability and its sharply rising cost, in real
terms, was a major factor choking off any
incentive for new investment. The low rice price
since the collapse of the commodity boom in the
mid-1980s discouraged the government and
international donor agencies from investing in new
irrigation construction. Though very drastic,
reduction in new construction investment is what
can be expected at the present stage of
development in irrigated agriculture.
The end of the construction phase signaled the
beginning of the management phase with high
profitability for major rehabilitation and water
management improvement projects in the domain
of public irrigation investment in Sri Lanka. But,
the economic performance of some such projects
was far less than expected, suggesting that project
design and implementation with due attention to
software and institutional focus are a prerequisite
for the realization of their economic potential. A
rough estimation of the required rehabilitation
investment indicates that there was severe under-
investment in the early 1990s. In spite of the high
rate of return to adequate O&M, the rate of under-
investment in O&M is estimated to be 65 percent
at present. Discrepancies between potentially high
profitability and actual investment trends in
rehabilitation and O&M indicate a compelling need
to improve the designing and implementation of
rehabilitation projects and O&M activities. Cost-
effective methods for system rehabilitation and
O&M with improvements in physical/engineering as
well as institutional aspects must be pursued.
Meanwhile, the poor performance and gradual
deterioration of the existing irrigation schemes
have spurred a revolution in groundwater
development. An increasing number of farmers
have been installing agro-wells and irrigation pumps
in the command and the highland. High rates of
social and private return on investment in agro-
wells and pumps have encouraged their rapid
diffusion, with great prospects for still further
diffusion in irrigation schemes. The management
phase in Sri Lanka now involves both groundwater
and surface water, and where groundwater use is
prevalent, irrigation systems should be managed
for conjunctive use to avoid high social costs.vi
Greater farmer participation, particularly in
O&M, is desirable. However, the government still
has a major role to play by providing public funds
for rehabilitation/O&M and also by managing basin-
level water resources to sustain productivity in the
existing systems, avoiding overexploitation of
groundwater, and controling pollution.
Development of irrigation in Sri Lanka needs a
two-pronged approach. First, the government
should vigorously act to devolve greater
responsibility for O&M on user groups, while
providing sufficient resources. It would be a great
challenge to harmonize the process of farmers’
greater involvement in O&M with the agro-well
“revolution” that is essentially an activity of the
individual farmer. Second, the government must
adopt new policies and develop new institutional
mechanisms for allocating water between agricultural
and non-agricultural uses at the river-basin level and
for regulating basin-level development of surface
water and groundwater irrigation at macro-level.
These steps are required to achieve higher
productivity and sustainability of irrigated agriculture,
assuring that in future too, irrigation remains the
backbone of rural and agricultural development, just
as it has been in the past.i i
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Summary Summary Summary Summary Summary
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Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction
Irrigation has been the most important strategic
factor in the development of the peasant sector
of Sri Lanka. Coupled with the diffusion of seed-
fertilizer technology, irrigation development has
tremendously contributed to increase domestic
rice production. As a result, the rate of rice self-
sufficiency has grown from about 40 percent in
1950 to over 90 percent in the 1990s. No one
can deny the great success the irrigation sector
has attained in this respect.
Having reached such a stage of
development, however, the role of the irrigation
sector is bound to change. The traditional target
of attaining self-sufficiency in rice has been
replaced by the new target of maintaining the
current self-sufficiency level while enhancing the
productivity of the irrigated land base by
diversifying agriculture with high-value, non-rice
crops and increasing the productivity of paddy
cultivation (Barker and Samad 1998). This new
target must be achieved not through the
expansion of irrigated areas as in the past but
through better water management in existing
irrigation schemes. Is the irrigation sector in Sri
Lanka adapting well to this new situation? What
will be the future of the sector? This paper tries
to shed light on these aspects by documenting
recent trends in irrigation investment in both
public and private sectors; the public
investments by the government in pursuance of
the study by Aluwihare and Kikuchi (1991), and
the private investment by farmers, based on
data collected from an island-wide field survey.
The next section of the paper provides a
conceptual framework for the development
phases of irrigated agriculture. This is followed
by a presentation of the trends in government
investments in new irrigation construction,
rehabilitation, and O&M from 1948 to 1999 and
also the trends in the rate of return to these
investments. A comparison is made of needed
and actual investments in rehabilitation and
O&M. The trends in private investments in
agro-wells and irrigation pumps made by
individual farmers are then presented, together
with the degree of diffusion of their various
types in irrigation schemes in the dry zone, the
economic performance of these well-pump
investments, and their future prospects. The
paper concludes with suggestions for attaining
higher productivity and sustainability of irrigated
agriculture.2
Development Phases of Irrigated Agriculture Development Phases of Irrigated Agriculture Development Phases of Irrigated Agriculture Development Phases of Irrigated Agriculture Development Phases of Irrigated Agriculture
Before proceeding to the data documentation, let
us briefly consider the development paths of
irrigated agriculture in monsoon Asia in the context
of the development of land infrastructure based on
Kikuchi and Hayami (1978) and Kikuchi, Maruyama
and Hayami (2001), and locate the development
experience of the irrigation sector in Sri Lanka
within this conceptual framework. In figure 1, curve
A represents the marginal cost of increasing
agricultural output by opening new land, and curve
I represents the marginal cost of raising agricultural
production by constructing new irrigation facilities.
At an early stage of agricultural development with
abundant land resources, curve A remains
horizontal and below curve I. As population
pressure pushes the cultivation frontier into
marginal areas, curve A would rise and cross
curve I from below. When the economy reaches
the cross-over point t1, irrigation development
becomes a more profitable base for agricultural
growth than opening new land.
As the area under irrigation expands, the
irrigation construction moves from the relatively
easier and less costly sites to the more difficult
and more costly ones. This means that curve I
would also show a rising trend. The rising cost
would eventually choke off the incentive to invest
in new irrigation construction. The introduction of
seed-fertilizer technology requires assured water
supply as a prerequisite for its diffusion. This has
the effect of reducing the cost of irrigation
required to produce a unit of additional income in
agriculture, as illustrated by the shift of curve I,
downward to curve I’, and preserves the
incentive to invest in creating new irrigation
infrastructure. Given a certain level of agricultural
technology, however, the marginal cost of
irrigation construction would eventually start
rising sharply as the potential sites for irrigation
development are exhausted.
Curve W would then emerge as the third
growth path, based on the enhancement of the
FIGURE 1.
Hypothetical development paths of land-based agriculture by means of land development: Marginal cost of producing a
unit of agricultural output by new land opening (A), new irrigation construction (I) and improvements to existing irrigation
infrastructure (W).3
quality and performance of the existing irrigated
land base that has already been developed.
1
There are many possible alternatives to attain
this. The most conventional way is the
rehabilitation and modernization of existing
irrigation systems. The improvement of irrigation
performance through better management,
particularly with greater farmer participation in
the O&M of the systems, is another. The
conjunctive management of surface water and
groundwater certainly increases the productivity
of the existing irrigated land base. Agrowell
development in existing command areas
represents one example of such conjunctive use.
There are other options, such as micro-irrigation
(trickle irrigation, sprinkler irrigation, etc.,) and
“melon vine” systems with small reservoirs built
below the main reservoir to allow greater control
over water deliveries at the farm level. It should be
noted that none of the alternatives described above
is mutually exclusive and all involve greater farmer
participation in the management of water deliveries
and maintenance of the system.
Using the data up to mid-1980s, Aluwihare and
Kikuchi (1991) clearly show that the phase of new
irrigation construction in Sri Lanka had been over
by the early 1980s, though economic opportunities
are wide open for improving the quality and
performance of the existing irrigated land base.
Their assumption that the irrigation sector shifted
from the construction phase to the management
phase can be interpreted as the shift in the
development momentum from phase II to phase III
in figure 1.
Nearly two decades have passed since the
irrigation sector in Sri Lanka entered phase III.
Changes are expected in phase III; in particular,
the reduction in new irrigation construction
investments, improvements in water management,
enhanced O&M and the cost-effective
rehabilitation/modernization of existing systems.
Have these changes associated with public
investments in the irrigation sector been taking
effect? What about the private irrigation
investments that had been nearly non-existent in
phases I and II?
1It may seem anomalous to assume that agricultural production can be increased in the third phase by improving the irrigation performance
of existing systems. So long as the existing systems are managed adequately for exploiting their full designed potential, there is no possibility
of increasing production through management improvements. In reality, however, irrigation systems in developing countries are rarely operat-
ing anywhere near their potential due to faulty design and construction, neglected maintenance and inadequate operation. The development
potentials along curve W have thus been created, at least partly, by undesirable conditions under which irrigation systems have been con-
structed and operated.
Public Irrigation Investments Public Irrigation Investments Public Irrigation Investments Public Irrigation Investments Public Irrigation Investments
First, through updating the data compiled by
Aluwihare and Kikuchi (1991), let us look into the
trends in public irrigation investments, made by
the government with assistance from
international donor agencies.
Investment T Investment T Investment T Investment T Investment Trends rends rends rends rends
The trends in government irrigation investments/
expenditures, in terms of 1995 constant prices
and five-year averages, are shown in figure 2
and table 1, by investment/expenditure type. The
total public investment in the irrigation sector
showed a sharp decline from a very high peak
during the decade between the early 1980s and
the early 1990s. For the public investment as a
whole, the declining trend bottomed in the early
1990s and the total government irrigation
investment has kept at a low level since then.
Earlier in the decade following the Korean War,
from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, the4
irrigation sector experienced a long period of
decline in investment. The decline in the last
decade, however, has been more severe in
terms of its degree and duration. As a result, the
total public irrigation investment declined to an
unprecedented low level—in 1995 it was one
seventh of the peak level in 1983.
Declining trends in the weight of public
irrigation investments relative to the government
budget, total public investments and total foreign
assistance have also been evident (table 2).
Irrigation, which was once the most important
budget item in public investment and foreign
assistance, now accounts for a very minor
fraction. Irrigation still takes a quarter of the total
public investments in agriculture, but the share of
agriculture in public investment and foreign
assistance has also been declining rapidly.
2
Among the three types of public investment,
new irrigation construction has experienced the
sharpest decline and it is still declining (figure 2
and table 1); compared to its peak, the present
level is far less than one tenth. Investment in
irrigation rehabilitation, which had emerged in the
mid-1970s, increased toward the mid-1980s, and
decreased since then toward the mid-1990s to a
level less than one half of the peak in the mid-
1980s. However, it has shown slight increases
since then. Total O&M expenditures have been
stagnant or even declining since the mid-1980s
in spite of some increases in the irrigated area
for this period (table 1). The percentage share of
new irrigation construction in the total irrigation
investment, which was as high as 90 percent
until the early 1980s, had decreased to less than
30 percent in the late 1990s, while rehabilitation
FIGURE 2.
Irrigation investments in Sri Lanka, 5-year moving averages, 1950-997.
2It should be noted that the war in the northern and eastern provinces in the last two decades must have affected the investment trends. The
rapid decline in the share of public investments in the total government budget from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s (table 2) might have
resulted from the increasing share of the government budget spent for the war. It would have reduced the irrigation investments directly. For
example, construction works in Mahaweli system A and Maduru Oya Right Bank projects were discontinued due to the war. We believe,
however, that the investment depressing impacts of the war have not been so strong as to change the investment trends significantly, since
the irrigation schemes in the northern and eastern provinces constitute only a small fraction of the entire irrigated land base in the country.
Such a conjecture is supported by the fact that nearly the same investment trends are found for the same period in other Asian countries
such as the Philippines (Kikuchi, Maruyama and Hayami 2000).5
has increased its share to more than 40 percent.
More than 50 percent of the public funds spent
for irrigation investment now goes to irrigation
rehabilitation.
A decline in the share in total public
investment and in foreign assistance for
agriculture as well as the irrigation sector is not
necessarily a problem. For instance, a decline in
agricultural investment share could be a genuine
sign of rapid development in the non-agricultural
sectors. In particular, it is no surprise at all to
see a significant decline in new irrigation
construction investment. Rather, in phase III,
improvements in the performance of the existing
irrigation systems are considered to be the major
vehicle of agricultural development. But are
these anticipated improvements taking place?
Rate of Return to Irrigation Rate of Return to Irrigation Rate of Return to Irrigation Rate of Return to Irrigation Rate of Return to Irrigation
Investments Investments Investments Investments Investments
First, let us examine the change over time, in
the rates of return to public investments on
new irrigation construction and rehabilitation of
existing irrigation systems. A few new
construction and major rehabilitation irrigation
projects were completed in the 1990s. With the
data available on some of these recent
projects, the rates of return to public irrigation
investment of different types are re-estimated.
Except for some assumptions that are modified
to represent changes in the rice sector during
the last decade, the estimation follows the
procedure adopted by Aluwihare and Kikuchi
(1991).
Investment (Rs billion in 1995 prices) Share (%)
Public investment                 Public investment
New Rehabili- O&M Private Total New Rehabili- O&M Private Total
const- tation invest- const- tation invest-
ruction ment2 ruction ment
1950 2.47 - 0.09 0.00 2.56 96 - 4 0 100
1955 2.36 - 0.11 0.00 2.46 96 - 4 0 100
1960 1.54 - 0.32 0.00 1.86 83 - 17 0 100
1965 1.59 - 0.16 0.00 1.75 91 - 9 0 100
1970 2.55 - 0.20 0.00 2.75 93 - 7 0 100
1975 2.86 0.01 0.33 0.02 3.22 89 0 10 1 100
1980 7.76 0.58 0.35 0.03 8.71 89 7 4 0 100
1985 7.11 1.16 0.40 0.08 8.74 81 13 5 1 100
1990 1.73 0.52 0.27 0.23 2.74 63 19 10 8 100
1995 0.69 0.61 0.28 0.37 1.96 35 31 14 19 100
1997 0.62 0.92 0.26 0.44 2.23 28 41 11 19 100
1
Five-year averages centering on the years shown.
2Investments on agro-wells and irrigation pumps by farmers.
TABLE 1.
 Irrigation investments in Sri Lanka by type of investment and their shares, 1950-97.16
Value (Rs billion in 1995 prices)
Total Total Total Total Total
government public public foreign public
budget investment investment assistance irrigation
in agriculture investment
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1950 37 8 4 - 3
1955 50 10 5 1 2
1960 72 13 7 1 2
1965 90 16 8 4 2
1970 117 21 13 8 3
1975 150 27 13 15 3
1980 176 49 16 39 9
1985 165 50 24 31 9
1990 191 36 10 29 3
1995 231 32 6 23 2
1997 230 31 5 18 2   
Share in percent
(5)/(1) (5)/(2) (5)/(3) (5)/(4) (3)/(1) (3)/(2) (3)/(4)
1950 7.0 33 72 - 10 46 -
1955 4.9 25 51 168 10 48 328
1960 2.6 14 28 129 9 52 459
1965 2.0 11 21 39 9 51 185
1970 2.3 13 20 33 11 63 160
1975 2.1 12 25 22 9 47 86
1980 4.9 18 54 22 9 33 41
1985 5.3 17 36 28 15 48 79
1990 1.3 7 25 9 5 28 34
1995 0.8 6 35 9 2 17 24
1997 1.0 7 44 13 2 16 29
1Five-year averages centering on the years shown.
TABLE 2.
Government budget, public investment and public irrigation investment, 1950-97.1
The rate of return to irrigation investments is
analyzed by estimating the cost-benefit ratio and
the internal rate of return. The following
estimation formula is used for the cost-benefit
ratio (C/B):
C/B = [(1+i)












where: R = annual increase in income due to
the project,
c = annual O&M cost to maintain the
benefit stream,
K = capital cost,
n = lifetime of the irrigation scheme
constructed/rehabilitated,
p = number of years between the year
when the benefit partially starts
accruing and the year of project
completion (defined for p³2),
m = average gestation period of the
capital investment, and
i = interest/discount rate (assumed to
be 10 percent).
The internal rate of return (IRR) is defined as








It should be noted that the first term of the
benefit formula is introduced to take into account
the cases where a part of the benefit starts
accruing before project completion, assuming
linear increases in benefits from zero to the full
benefit level.
Throughout the analysis, 1995 prices are
used for the constant-price estimation, and the
GDP implicit deflator for construction is adopted
whenever deflation is necessary.
New irrigation construction: New irrigation construction: New irrigation construction: New irrigation construction: New irrigation construction: For new irrigation
construction projects, additional data are
available only for Zones 3-6 of the Mahaweli
System C, which was completed in 1994 (World
Bank 1993). A time-series of capital cost per ha
is compiled using 50 new irrigation construction
projects, including this new set of data. In this
compilation, the unit cost of each project is
recorded in the year the project was completed,
3
and, in case there was more than one project
completed in a year, the weighted average is
taken using the system command area as
weight. The resulting series in 1995 constant
prices is presented in figure 3. Fitting the
exponential time- trend curve to this series gives
the following result:
K* = -106.3 + 0.057 t R
2  = 0.713
 (-6.84)  (7.23)
where: K* = capital cost per ha including capital
interest (Rs 1,000 in 1995 prices),
t = time
R
2 = coefficient of determination, and
the figures in parentheses are
t-ratios.
The unit capital cost estimated by this trend
curve is used as the cost of new irrigation
construction.
FIGURE 3.
Changes in the real capital costs per hectare (including capital interest evaluated at 10 percent per annum) of new
irrigation construction, 1950-1997, in 1995 constant prices.
3In Aluwihare and Kikuchi (1991), it was recorded as in the year the project reached 90 percent completion.8
On the benefit side, rice is assumed to be the
crop to be grown, since rice has remained as the
main crop in major schemes in the last and the
previous decades. Except for the areas equipped
with agro-wells and irrigation pumps, the extent
planted with other field crops (OFCs) in major
irrigation schemes was negligible in spite of the
major efforts made by the government for crop
diversification in rice-based major schemes. Note
also that we have not included the benefits and
costs of hydropower that occur in some of the
larger projects such as Mahaweli.
In order to analyze the complementary
relationship between irrigation and seed-fertilizer
technology, three different seed-fertilizer
technology levels are assumed: 1) traditional
varieties with 0 kg per ha of nitrogen application
(TVN=0 kg), 2) old-improved varieties with 70
kg per ha of nitrogen (OIV N=70 kg) and 3)
new/ improved varieties with 140 kg per ha of
nitrogen (NIV N=140 kg). The rice output for
each technology level is estimated by the
national average fertilizer response function at
the farm level for each variety group, which is
derived from the fertilizer response function at
the experiment station level. The response
functions at the experiment station level are re-
estimated using the data presented in Kikuchi
and Aluwihare (1990).
4
The benefit flow is measured as an increase
in agricultural income (gross value-added),
assuming zero opportunity cost for labor.
5 The
total current input in rice production is assumed
to be 2.5 times the cost of nitrogen. For the
constant price estimation, the average farm-gate
prices for 1993-97 are used for both rough rice
and nitrogen. In the current price estimation, the
farm-gate equivalent border prices are used for
evaluating the value added.
6 The cropping
intensity of the systems is assumed to be 1.4,
which is the average for all the major irrigation
systems for the entire study period. The O&M
cost is assumed to be Rs 1,830 per hectare in
1995 prices. This is the level that the Irrigation
Department set as the “desired level” of O&M for
major irrigation systems (IIMI 1989). It should be
noted that many independent studies on O&M
needs, including those with detailed engineering
examination, come up with approximately this
level of desired O&M intensity (Ariyaratne 1990;
Sheladia 1990; World Bank 1993). Finally, the
usable life of newly constructed irrigation scheme
(n) is assumed to be 50 years, following the
convention in the cost-benefit analysis for
irrigation projects.
The results of constant-price estimation are
presented in figure 4 and table 3. The re-
estimation of the profitability of new irrigation
construction does not change the conclusions
obtained in the earlier study. The trends of C/B
ratios for the different levels of seed-fertilizer
technology in figure 4 simulate well the marginal
cost curves I and I’ in figure 1. In spite of some
favorable changes in the assumptions for the
latest technology level (NIV N=140 kg),
7 the C/B
ratio curve exceeds unity in the early 1980s, and
reaches a level nearly two by the mid-1990s. In
terms of IRR, the present level of profitability of
new irrigation construction investments is as low
as five percent.
4For the estimation of rice fertilizer response functions, see annex B of this paper.
5Zero opportunity cost of labor is a plausible assumption in dry zone irrigation systems. It is particularly so for the case of new irrigation
construction that has mostly been implemented in the dry zone as colonization projects involving farmers’ resettlement. It should be plausible
to think that new settlers had a difficulty in finding productive employment opportunities in their original place. If so, the opportunity cost of
their labor should be quite low, if not zero.
6As to the border prices of rice and nitrogen, see Kikuchi et al. 2000. The prices and other parameters related to the estimation are presented
in annex B.
7For example, the yield is increased nearly by one metric ton per hectare for this technology level.9
FIGURE 4.
Changes in cost-benefit ratio of new irrigation construction investments, 1950-1997, by level of seed-fertilizer technology,
based on 1995 constant prices.
Technology Level
Traditional varieties Old improved varieties New improved varieties
N=0 kg N=70 kg N=140 kg
Cost- Internal Cost- Internal Cost- Internal
benefit rate of benefit rate of benefit rate of




1960 0.69 14 0.50 18
1965 0.92 11 0.66 14
1970 1.22 8 0.88 11 0.48 19
1975 1.62 6 1.17 9 0.63 15
1980 2.15 5 1.56 7 0.84 12
1985 2.86 3 2.07 5 1.12 9
1990 3.80 2 2.76 3 1.49 7
1995 5.05 1 3.66 2 1.98 5
1997 5.66 0.5 4.11 1.7 2.21 4.5
TABLE 3.
Cost-benefit ratios and internal rate of return on investments in new irrigation construction, by level of seed-fertilizer
technology, five-year averages, based on 1995 constant prices.1
1For the estimation formula and assumptions, see the text and annex A.10
As we see in figure 2, the new irrigation
investments have been declining sharply since
the early 1980s. This corresponds to the long-
run trend in the C/B ratios. However, the
decision of the government and international
donor agencies about new irrigation
construction investments might have depended
more on their short-run profitability. This
proposition is supported by figure 5, which
shows the trends in the benefit-cost ratio and in
new construction investments expressed in
billions of rupees at 1995 prices. The benefit-
cost (B/C) ratio for new irrigation construction is
estimated as follows: 1) the benefit is evaluated
by applying current international prices
(converted to the farm-gate equivalent) of rough
rice and nitrogen, 2) the cost, both capital and
recurrent, is evaluated in current prices, and 3)
the B/C ratios for three technology levels thus
estimated are aggregated into a single series
using the percentage shares of the area
planted with each type of rice variety in each
year as weight.
It is apparent that the investment peak in the
early 1980s was created by the exceptionally
high profitability of the investments that resulted
from high international rice prices during the two
food crises in the 1970s. The decline in the B/C
ratio after this peak has been paralleled by the
equally sharp decline in the investments with
about a 7-year lag.
8 The pace of decline in the
profitability of the investments, has slowed down
slightly since the mid-1980s, inducing the same
change of pace in the investments, but there has
been no sign that the declining trend is reversed.
The most decisive factor behind this decline in
the current B/C ratio has been the decline in the
international rice price. This decline has been
brought about by the irrigation development in
preceding years, and the successful diffusion of
the seed-fertilizer technology in the irrigated
land-base of developing countries in Asia as a
whole. It is worth noting that consumers and not
farmers have been the main beneficiaries of
irrigation investments and seed-fertilizer
technology.
FIGURE 5.
Changes in benefit-cost ratio of new irrigation construction investments evaluated at current world prices and total new
irrigation construction investments in 1995 constant prices, five-year moving averages, 1960-1995.
8Note that this lag corresponds to the average gestation period of capital investments for new irrigation construction, as assumed in the cost-
benefit analysis.11
Rehabilitation and water management Rehabilitation and water management Rehabilitation and water management Rehabilitation and water management Rehabilitation and water management
improvement: improvement: improvement: improvement: improvement: We failed to find new data for
water management projects. However, new sets
of data are available for four rehabilitation/
modernization projects: the Village Irrigation
Rehabilitation Project (VIRP) completed in 1990,
the Irrigation System Management Project
(ISMP) completed in 1992, the Major Irrigation
Rehabilitation Project (MIRP) completed in 1994,
and the National Irrigation Rehabilitation Project
(NIRP) completed in 1999. It should be noted
that VIRP was to rehabilitate small village tank
systems (mostly minor irrigation schemes), and
so was NIRP. Including these three projects, the
rates of return of rehabilitation and water
management projects are re-estimated, based on
the 1995 constant prices. Similar to the new
irrigation construction projects, some
modifications in the parameters and assumptions
are made for the projects that were analyzed in
Aluwihare and Kikuchi (1991).
9 For the same
reason as for the new construction projects, rice
is assumed to be the crop grown.
The results of the estimation are summarized
in table 4, together with the rates of return of
new construction projects in the 1980s and 90s.
In the 1980s, the marginal cost of increasing
agricultural output through new irrigation
construction (curve I or I’ in figure 1) began to
rise sharply, cutting the C/B ratio = 1 line from
below (figure 4). At this point in time, that is
roughly the mid-1980s, the irrigation sector
moved in to phase III with curve W located
below curve I (or I’). In phase III, it is expected
to be more profitable to increase agricultural
output through improving the quality and
performance of the existing irrigated land-base.
Some rehabilitation/water management projects
have satisfied such expectations, but some
others have not.
Among the major rehabilitation projects
analyzed, the Gal Oya Project and the ISMP
show rates of return, significantly higher than
those of new construction projects. The internal
rate of return of the Gal Oya Project is 26
percent and the C/B ratio is 0.37.
10 The Tank
Irrigation Modernization Project (TIMP), the first
of the major rehabilitation projects undertaken
in Sri Lanka, met with limited success. The
major focus of the TIMP was physical
improvements, with scant attention to
institutional development. The project inevitably
had many defects in its design and
implementation. Nonetheless, it provided useful
lessons for implementing future irrigation
rehabilitation projects.
11
It is rather surprising to see very low rates
of return for the VIRP and the MIRP; their C/B
ratios, though marginally lower than for new
construction projects in the corresponding
period, are equal to or more than unity. As was
the case with Gal Oya Project and the ISMP,
these projects could have benefited from the
lessons from the TIMP, that clearly
9Basic parameters and assumptions are presented in annex table a-5.
10The estimated economic performance of the Gal Oya Project in this paper is better than that in Aluwihare and Kikuchi (1991) due to a
favorable assumption on the post-project yield level made in this paper based on Amarasinghe et al. (1998), (see annex table a-5). It should
also be noted that the reliability of the estimate of benefits due to the project is highest for the Gal Oya Project because of data availability
from many intensive post-project studies conducted for this project. The estimate of project benefits for the ISMP, which was a very innova-
tive project laying heavy emphasis on institutional aspects of water management with least unit capital cost among the major rehabilitation
projects implemented thus far in the country, is not as reliable as the estimate for the Gal Oya Project, because of paucity of data on the post-
project state.
11The IRR of the TIMP, is estimated to be 10 percent, which is lower than the estimate in 1986 prices (Aluwihare and Kikuchi 1991), in spite of
the assumptions made in favor of the benefit in the re-estimation. This is due to the fact that the prices related to construction have increased
faster than the price of rice between 1986 and 1995.12
1 For the technology level “New Improved Varieties; N=140kg.”
2
Years after the names of projects stand for the years when the projects completed.  For basic parameters/assumptions in the
estimation, see annex table a-5.
3 T stands for the year after the construction when, with no maintenance at all, the benefit flow due to irrigation ceases to accrue.  For details,
see text.
TABLE 4.
Rates of return on irrigation investments in recent decades: new irrigation construction, rehabilitation / water management
improvement, and O&M, based on 1995 constant prices.
C/B ratio Internal rate
of return (%)





II. II. II. II. II. Major rehabilitation projects: Major rehabilitation projects: Major rehabilitation projects: Major rehabilitation projects: Major rehabilitation projects:2 2 2 2 2
TIMP; 1984 1.04 10
Gal Oya; 1987 0.37 26
VIRP; 1990 1.09 9
ISMP; 1992 0.60 17
MIRP; 1994 1.02 10
NIRP; 1999 0.88 12
III. W III. W III. W III. W III. Water management projects: ater management projects: ater management projects: ater management projects: ater management projects:3 3 3 3 3
Kimbulwana; 1980 0.1 86
Pimburettawa; 1989 0.2 64
Nagadeepa; 1989 1.8 -22
IV IV IV IV IV. Desired level of O&M: . Desired level of O&M: . Desired level of O&M: . Desired level of O&M: . Desired level of O&M:3 3 3 3 3
T=30 0.2 34
T=40 0.3 23
 T=50 0.4  17  
demonstrated that physical improvements alone
will not be sufficient to improve performance
(Ratnayake 1997). Unlike the more successful
Gal Oya project and the ISMP, the VIRP and the
MIRP were heavily focussed on engineering
works with less attention to the institutional and
software aspect. This may explain the difference
in the investment performance between them. In
particular, the degree of failure of VIRP seems to
be very serious. Under VIRP, the unit capital
cost of rehabilitating minor irrigation schemes
was as high as Rs 65,000 per hectare, as
compared with Rs 60,000 per hectare for the Gal
Oya Project and Rs 40,000 per hectare for the
ISMP, all in 1995 prices. There must have been
some fundamental defects in the design and
implementation of the project, which the project
completion report(PCR) (World Bank 1992) fails
to point out.
It must be noted that our estimates of the
rate of return for TIMP, VIRP, MIRP and NIRP
are most likely overestimated.
12 For TIMP, the
reasons for overestimation are explained in
Aluwihare and Kikuchi (1991). For VIRP, MIRP
and NIRP, we use optimistic estimates regarding
the increase in cropping intensity—the most
critical parameter in determining the benefit flow
of this type of project—adopted from their PCRs
12As noted earlier, the rate of return of the ISMP may be overestimated, but the degree of possible overestimation for the ISMP is much less
than for the other three projects.13
(World Bank 1992, 1995 and 1999). It may be
worth mentioning that these PCRs report an IRR
of 16 percent, 20 percent and 14 percent for
VIRP, MIRP and NIRP, respectively. These
values, especially for VIRP and MIRP, are
overestimated. In the case of VIRP, the project
benefit is “inflated” by an assumption that the
irrigation systems deteriorate quickly without the
rehabilitation project; the value of the crop that is
forgone because of the deterioration is included
as a part of the benefit of the project. This
assumption is invalid, because the “desired level”
of O&M, which is included in the cost-benefit
analysis, minimizes the deterioration of the
systems after the project.
13 In the case of MIRP,
the project benefit is “inflated” due to the
assumption of a large yield increase not directly
caused by the rehabilitation project.
Water management improvement projects
can be extremely profitable as the Kimbulwana
and Pimburettawa projects reveal. However,
there can also be failure cases, as evidenced by
the Nagadeepa Project.
14 Lessons that can be
learned from these experiences are found in
Aluwihare and Kikuchi (1991).
O&M expenditure: O&M expenditure: O&M expenditure: O&M expenditure: O&M expenditure: All the estimated rates of
return for irrigation investments thus far in this
section assume that O&M of irrigation systems is
carried out at the ‘desired’ level after the project.
What about the rate of return to recurrent
investments in O&M activities? In spite of the
critical importance of O&M in maintaining the
performance of irrigation systems, there have
been few attempts to estimate the rate of return
to O&M expenditures. This is partly because no
reliable estimate is available about the possible
benefit for recurrent investments on O&M
activities. Let us try here to estimate a rough
order of the rate of returns for O&M
expenditures.
15
As mentioned earlier, the life span of a newly
constructed irrigation system is conventionally
assumed to be 50 years. It is expected that the
‘desired’ level of O&M expenditures, maintains
the benefit stream due to irrigation during this life
span. As a matter of fact, however, rehabilitation
projects have been implemented in many
systems much earlier than the end of this life
span. For example, the systems included in the
TIMP were selected for rehabilitation, on
average, only 11 years after the completion of
their new construction projects. In other
rehabilitation projects implemented in Sri Lanka
so far, this duration rarely exceeds 20 years.
16
This is a definite sign that the irrigation systems
have been deteriorating rapidly due to the less-
than-desired level of O&M.
13In other words, they include the benefit attributable to the O&M expenditures in the benefit of the rehabilitation project.
14 Aluwihare and Kikuchi (1991) estimated the IRR of the Nagadeepa Project to be six percent, which is apparently a mistake.
15Readers should be warned that our values for the rate of return to O&M expenditures may be subject to some overestimation. The level of
the rate of return depends critically not only on T but also on the shape of the deteriorating curve along which the quality and performance of
irrigation systems deteriorate over time if there is no O&M at all. The curve may have a shape in which the deterioration proceeds more
slowly than the case of the parabolic shape assumed here. In the real world, if an irrigation system begins to deteriorate because of the lack
of maintenance, the system management as well as farmers may take a series of adjustments that can be made to counteract the deteriora-
tion; for example, using freeboard to compensate for loss of flow capacity at the system level, and increased intensity of management at the
farm level. The adoption of these adjustments may delay the emergence of the adverse impacts of the lack of maintenance. It should be
pointed out, however, that these adjustments are not costless. For example, intensified management at the farm-level in order to counteract
quality deterioration entails a certain level of cost, which is a part of foregone benefits of the adequate level of O&M. In any case, how an
irrigation system deteriorates without maintenance is left to be an important research area in the future. Here, we present the estimation
results of the rate of return to O&M, based on the assumption of parabolic-shaped deterioration curves for illustrating the importance of O&M.
16This duration was 15 years for the Gal Oya Rehabilitation Project and 19 years for the MIRP.14
It is difficult to identify how rapidly an
irrigation system deteriorates if no maintenance
activity is done at all. As an illustration, let us
assume that with zero maintenance, the
performance of an irrigation system deteriorates
over time in a parabolic way such that the
benefit stream goes down to zero T years after
its construction. The difference between the total
benefit stream for the full 50-year life span with
the desired level of O&M, and that for the
reduced T-year life span with zero maintenance,
thus gives the benefit of the desired level of
O&M. Assuming the technology level of NIV
N=140 kg, the desired O&M level of Rs 1,830
per hectare, and the time discount rate of 10
percent, the C/B ratio and the IRR of the
recurrent O&M investment are estimated for
different levels of T (table 4).
17 In terms of IRR,
the estimated rate of return ranges between 34
percent for T=30 years and 17 percent for T=50
years.
18 It may be unlikely that an irrigation
system collapses within 30 years if there is no
maintenance at all, and it is even more unlikely
that it takes 50 years for the benefit flow to
cease accruing. In the environmental context of
the dry zone in Sri Lanka, it appears reasonable
to suppose that the reduced life span in reality is
closer to T=30 rather than T=50. In any case,
the results of our illustrative estimation suggests
that the recurrent investment on O&M activities
has a very high rate of return. Its rate of return
could be higher than that of a major rehabilitation
project, and significantly higher than that of new
construction investment in the 1990s.
Altogether in this section, we can conclude
that the irrigation sector in Sri Lanka has been in
phase III of irrigated agriculture since the early
1980s; curve W is located below curve I (or I’).
However, it is much more difficult for public
irrigation investments to realize the profitability
envisaged by curve W than to realize that
envisaged by curve I. Deliberate project design
and implementation with due consideration on
the software and institutional aspects of the
project is a prerequisite for the rehabilitation/
water management project in phase III to be
successful. It should also be pointed out that the
potentially high rates of return of phase III
projects do not seem to have induced a steady
increase in investments on this type of project in
the recent decade. On the contrary, as observed
in figure 2 and table 1, investments in irrigation
rehabilitation had decreased considerably since
the mid- 1980s up to the mid-1990s, and O&M
expenditures were declining since the mid-1980s.
Investment Needs versus Actual Investment Needs versus Actual Investment Needs versus Actual Investment Needs versus Actual Investment Needs versus Actual
Investments Investments Investments Investments Investments
The estimated trend of the profitability of new
irrigation construction clearly explains the rapid
shrink of new construction investments in recent
years. However, it appears that the difficulties in
dealing with rehabilitation and water
management projects have resulted in under-
investment in these projects, despite their
potentially high rates of return. Under-investment
17The formula for the C/B ratio is given as follows:
C/B = [ ∑t=1
50 c / (1 + i)
t ] / {∑t=1
T [R - (a - bt
2)] / (1 + i)
t + ∑t=T
50 R / (1 + i)
t }
where R = annual income generated by irrigation system, c = annual O&M expenditure, t = time, and a and b = parameters so that R goes
down to zero at t = T. The formula for IRR is defined accordingly.
18If systems deteriorate linearly, instead of in parabolic shape, the IRR of O&M investment is as high as 106 percent even for T=50.15
in O&M, which has been a chronic problem ever
since, appears to have grown even more acute
in recent years. One reason for this under-
investment in the past has been the willingness
of the World Bank and other donors to fund the
rehabilitation of even those projects that have
been constructed fairly recently. As long as this
prospect exists, there is a tendency in
governments to allow irrigation systems to
deteriorate at a fairly rapid rate.
In order to have a fair idea about the
seriousness of the under-investment in the
irrigation sector, let us estimate the investment
needs of this sector. Since we expect that public
irrigation investments in phase III are principally
limited to rehabilitation/water management
projects and O&M, we focused on their
investment needs.
Rehabilitation investments: Rehabilitation investments: Rehabilitation investments: Rehabilitation investments: Rehabilitation investments: Capital investments
required to rehabilitate irrigation systems could
vary depending on various conditions specific to
each system. In fact, the capital cost per ha of
the rehabilitation projects implemented thus far in
Sri Lanka ranges from Rs 38,000 for ISMP to Rs
60,000 for the Gal Oya, and further to Rs
131,000 for TIMP.
19 The experience in the past,
however, indicates that under ordinary conditions
it becomes progressively difficult for a major
rehabilitation project to attain a reasonable level
of economic performance if the unit capital cost
becomes higher than the Gal Oya level.
20 As the
minimum level of rehabilitation cost, let us
assume here the capital cost of Rs 60,000 per
ha in 1995 prices.
21
The total irrigated area in Sri Lanka at
present is about 500,000 ha, consisting of
320,000 ha under major irrigation schemes and
180,000 ha under minor irrigation schemes.
Assuming 25 years as the lifetime of a
rehabilitation project, the annual need of funds
for rehabilitating irrigation systems is calculated
to be Rs 1.2 billion. Note that this is considered
the minimum requirement. The actual level of the
investments in 1997, which is Rs 0.92 billion
(table 1), is about 75 percent of this required
level. The actual level is an under-investment,
but the degree of under-investment is not so
serious. It should be noticed that the actual
investment was 50 percent of the required level
in 1995 and 40 percent in 1990.
O&M expenditure: O&M expenditure: O&M expenditure: O&M expenditure: O&M expenditure: In the cost-benefit analysis,
the “desired level” of O&M expenditures is
assumed to be Rs 1,830 per hectare for major
irrigation schemes, and Rs 940 per hectare for
minor irrigation schemes, both in 1995 prices.
The total funds required annually for operating
and maintaining the irrigation systems at the
“ideal” state is estimated to be Rs 0.75 billion.
Compared to this required level, the actual O&M
expenditures in 1997 amount only to 35
percent.
22 Thus the O&M of irrigation systems is
highly under-invested.
It should be mentioned that who shoulders
O&M costs does not matter in the present context.
As in many other developing countries, the
participation of farmer-beneficiaries in O&M has
been emphasized in Sri Lanka. Transfer of O&M
responsibility of irrigation facilities below the
19See annex table a-5.
20It should be emphasized that the unit capital cost for rehabilitation of this level is Rs 60,000/ha or US$1,200/ha in 1995 prices at the ex-
change rate in 1995. If necessary, the capital cost for rehabilitating an irrigation system is higher than this level, an extremely high level of
physical performance is required for such a project to attain an economically justifiable level of rate of return.
21Another choice is to represent the minimum rehabilitation requirement by the unit capital cost of the ISMP. But, we do not take it, mostly
because the economic performance of this project is not as clear as that of the Gal Oya project.
22World Bank (1995) reports that the O&M fund actually allocated in 1993 to the major irrigation systems under irrigation development and
irrigation management development was less than 30 percent of the “desired level.”16
distributing canals, to water users, has in fact been
the stated policy of the government since a decade
ago (Samad and Vermillion 1999). The promotion
of farmer participation through formation of effective
farmer organizations has been of central
importance in many water management
improvement projects, including those analyzed in
this paper. In many countries, irrigation
management transfer (IMT) aims not only at
enhancing system performance but also at
reducing government costs. In the case of Sri
Lanka, however, the higher involvement of farmers
in O&M does not necessarily mean a significant
reduction in the government O&M expenditures; by
and large the government is still responsible for
providing O&M provisions. Therefore, the estimated
rate of under-investment in O&M needs little
adjustment in this respect.
23
23No data are available as to the degree of savings in financial outlay due to the participatory approach. The fact that all the recent project
completion reports, either of new construction or of rehabilitation, unanimously point out inadequate O&M resulting from insufficient funds as
the detriment against the sustainability of the projects, suggests that these savings, if any, are not sufficient to counteract the declining trend
in financial outlay for O&M per unit of irrigated area.
24In this paper, an agro-well is defined as a well, the water from which is fully or partially used for crop cultivation.
25There are some pump irrigation schemes that were constructed and managed by the government. The pumps of these schemes are large,
not like the ones farmers install for their own use.
Private Irrigation Investments Private Irrigation Investments Private Irrigation Investments Private Irrigation Investments Private Irrigation Investments
As in many other countries in monsoon Asia, a
salient feature of the irrigation sector in Sri
Lanka during the last decade has been the rapid
diffusion of agro- wells
24 and small irrigation
pumps among farmers in irrigation systems,
which we specify as a possible option in phase
III. Needless to say, agro-wells and pumps are
private investments made by individual farmers,
except for the subsidy, if any, given to them.
25 In
this section, we present the trends of these
private investments, based on the data we
collected from field surveys in the dry zone.
Three points should be noted at the outset.
First, our estimation of private irrigation
investments is confined to agro-wells and pumps
owned by farmers in irrigation schemes, minor
as well as major, in the dry zone. All investments
in constructing and rehabilitating minor irrigation
schemes made by the government are included
in the public investments, but farmers may have
spontaneous investments too in the form of labor
mobilized for construction, rehabilitation and
maintenance of their schemes. Such investments
made collectively by farmers in minor irrigation
schemes are not accounted for in this study as
data are not available. Though expected to be a
small fraction of the total investments of farmers
on agro-wells and pumps, such investments of
upland farmers who do not cultivate paddy in
irrigation schemes and by farmers in the wet
zone are not included, too. Second, our
estimation depends on a very small sample, and
the estimated results would constitute only a
hunch regarding the magnitude of farmers’
investments on agro-wells and pumps. Third,
however, fragmented available data on the17
diffusion of agro- wells and pumps in Sri Lanka
are all consistent with our estimation.
26
Diffusion of Agro-wells and Pumps and Diffusion of Agro-wells and Pumps and Diffusion of Agro-wells and Pumps and Diffusion of Agro-wells and Pumps and Diffusion of Agro-wells and Pumps and
Investment T Investment T Investment T Investment T Investment Trends rends rends rends rends
First, let us observe the total numbers of agro-
wells and irrigation pumps in the irrigation
schemes in the dry zone at the turn of the
century (table 5). In the context of the dry zone
in Sri Lanka, agro-wells can be classified into, at
least three types: lined dug-wells, unlined dug-
wells and tubewells. The first two types are open
dug wells of 14 ft to 22 ft diameter and 14 ft to
40 ft deep.
27 The lined dug-well has its wall lined
with cement, whereas in the unlined dug-well the
wall is left just as dug using a machine shovel.
Tube wells make use of a 2 to 6 inch diameter
plastic pipe implanted vertically into the ground
down to the underground water table that is 15
to 60 ft deep.
28 It should be mentioned that the
type of well that has been promoted by the
government and non-profit making organizations
through subsidies is the lined dug-well.
29 In
contrast, the unlined dug-well and the tubewell
have been diffused entirely under farmers’ own
initiative.
For all three types of wells, water is usually
lifted up by a 2-inch pump, operated by diesel or
kerosene engine of 2.5 to 5 HP—the most
popular size being around 3.5 HP—with which a
2-inch pipe is used for distributing water to the
field.
30 Unlike the tubewell for domestic purposes
which is usually operated by a manual pump, the
tubewell for agriculture always has an engine or
a motor driven pump. Besides lifting
groundwater, farmers use pumps for lifting water
from rivers, canals or tanks (dead storage in
particular) to irrigate their crops.
26For details on our surveys, estimation processes and the results of estimation, see Kikuchi et al. 2001.
271 foot = 0.3048 m.
28 1 inch = 2.54 cm.
29The most popular government agencies that grant a subsidy for constructing lined dug-wells are the Agricultural Development Authority
(ADA) and the Provincial Councils (PC). Various non-profit organizations and non-government organizations, such as International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD), Asian Development Bank (ADB), OISCA Japan, and Isuru Foundation, extend a subsidy and subsidized
loan for well construction. There has been no subsidy program for irrigation pumps, but there have been some loan programs.
30The virtual nonexistence of electrically powered motors for pumping up groundwater in irrigation schemes is a salient feature of the well-
pump diffusion in Sri Lanka when compared with other countries in south Asia (Shah 1993). Upland cultivation in the Kalpitiya area in the
Puttalam district is an exception.
TABLE 5.
Numbers of dug wells, tubewells and irrigation pumps by region and by type of irrigation scheme, in the command and
highland areas of irrigation schemes in the dry zone of Sri Lanka, by the end of 2000.
Major schemes Minor schemes Total
No. (1000 units) % No. (1000 units) % No. (1000 units) %
Lined dug well       8.8 27              23.6 73           32.5 100
Unlined dug well             8.2 100  - -             8.2 100
Tube well             0.3 3                9.5 97             9.8 100
Irrigation pumps           38.8 36              68.1 64         106.9 100
Source: Kikuchi et al. 2001.18
As shown in table 5, it is estimated that there
are about 33,000 lined dug-wells, 8,000 unlined
dug-wells, 10,000 tubewells, and 100,000 irrigation
pumps in the irrigation schemes in the dry zone.
More than 70 percent of lined dug-wells are found
in minor irrigation schemes. Unlined dug-wells are
found only in major irrigation schemes, while
tubewells are found mostly in minor schemes. In
the case of irrigation pumps, more than 60 percent
are owned by farmers in minor schemes. About 10
percent of farmers in irrigation schemes, both
major and minor, own agro-wells, while about 15
percent own irrigation pumps (Kikuchi et al. 2001).
Some features of agro-wells and irrigation
pumps are summarized in table 6. Since 1989,
the government has been making major efforts to
promote lined dug-wells in both major and minor
irrigation schemes in the dry zone through
extending a subsidy to farmers. However, there
are many agro-wells that receive no subsidy. For
the three types combined, 45 percent of agro-
wells received the government subsidy. Even for
lined dug-wells alone, this percentage is less
than 50 percent and there has been no subsidy
program for unlined dug-wells and tubewells. All
this indicates that the majority of farmers who
own agro-wells made their investment decision
by themselves.
In irrigation schemes, agro-wells can be set up
either in the command area or in the highland.
Both in major and minor schemes, the distribution
of agro-wells between the command and the
highland is about 30:70—more agro-wells are set
up in the highland than in the command (table 6).
In major and minor schemes alike, farmers use
pump water mostly for irrigating other food crops
(OFCs). They use pumps for irrigating paddy
occasionally, only when water from their gravity
system is highly inadequate and their paddy plants
are critically in need of water. The fact that such
circumstances occur more often in minor schemes
may explain the observation that the use of water
for paddy is higher in minor schemes when
compared with major schemes, though the
percentage of agro-wells in the command area is
much higher in the major ones. The percentage
distribution of the source of water for pumping,
between groundwater from agro-wells and surface
water from rivers, canals and tanks, is not far apart
between major and minor schemes; groundwater
taking about 40 percent and surface water about
60 percent.
TABLE 6.
Percentages of wells with subsidy and those in highland, depth of wells, purposes and sources of pumping water, in
irrigation schemes in the dry zone of Sri Lanka, by the end of 2000.
1
Weighted averages are shown for the dry-zone total, using irrigated area as weights.
Source: Kikuchi et al. 2001.
   Major irrigation schemes Minor irrigation schemes Total1
I. % of agro-wells subsidised 39 44 41
II. % of agro-wells in high-land 72 74 73
III. Purpose of well/pumping (%)
Paddy cultivation 4 15 8
OFC cultivation 96 85 92
IV. Source of water (%)
Groundwater 37 46 40
River, canal or tank 63 54 60
V. Depth of open dug-well (feet)
M i n 1 81 81 8
M a x 2 84 04 0
Average 22 24 2319
The dug-wells are generally shallow, ranging
from a minimum of 14 ft to a maximum of 40 ft
(table 6). It is interesting to observe that the
minimum and the maximum depths are greater in
the minor schemes than in the major schemes.
Accordingly, the average depth is 22 ft for major
schemes and 24 ft for minor schemes. This also
suggests that farmers in major schemes
generally face better groundwater conditions than
those in minor schemes do face. Indeed, the
depth or the level of the groundwater table is the
most critical factor that determines the economic
performance of agro-wells. The cost of digging
them depends heavily on the required depth.
Throughout the dry zone, it is not rare at all to
see abandoned dug-wells; at least, 10 percent of
the dug-wells are abandoned or left unused in
both major and minor schemes.
31 The reason,
more often than not, is the low economic
profitability in their use, and the depth of wells is
a criterion for profitability.
32
The estimated private investments on agro-
wells and irrigation pumps by farmers are
summarized in table 7, and their trends are
depicted in figure 6.
33 As in the case of public
investments, private investments are expressed
in 1995 prices, using the implicit GDP deflator
for construction as the deflator.
It is estimated that the total private
investment in wells and pumps is about Rs 0.5
billion (in 1995 prices) at present, of which 55
percent is on lined dug-wells and 42 percent is
31Abandoned dug-wells are found more in regions with unfavorable groundwater conditions such as in the southern dry zone, but it is not rare
to find abandoned wells even in the northwestern dry zone where groundwater conditions are considered most favorable.
32Many farmers interviewed maintained that should the depth of groundwater table be more than 30 ft, little chance would exist for an agro-
well to be successful. This is in sharp contrast with the fact that there are many wells for domestic water in non-agro-well areas, which are as
deep as 100 ft.
33Farmers’ investments in agro-wells and pumps are estimated simply by assuming standard rates for costs of installing agro-wells and irriga-
tion pumps. The following rates in year 2000 prices are assumed: lined dug-well (diameter = 20 ft, depth = 20 ft) = Rs 81,000; unlined dug-
well (diameter = 20 ft, depth = 20 ft) = Rs 6,200; tubewell (diameter=4 inch, depth=24 ft) = Rs 7,000; and pump (2 inch diesel 3.5HP with 2
inch pipe of 200 ft) = Rs 38,400. For more details, see Kikuchi et al. (2001).
FIGURE 6.
Private investments in agro-wells and irrigation pumps in irrigation schemes in the dry zone of Sri Lanka, in 1995 prices,
1965-2000.20
on pumps (table 7). Investments in unlined dug-
wells and tubewells are negligible in terms of
value, mostly because of their cheap
construction costs. The percentage share of the
investment on lined dug-wells in total private
irrigation investment has been increasing rapidly,
exceeding 50 percent in 1997.
It should be noted that the investment series
for lined dug-wells in table 7 includes subsidies
given to farmers by the government, donor
organizations and NGOs, that should be
considered as ‘public’ investments. The total
amount of the subsidy given to farmers is
estimated to be Rs 59 million or 11 percent of
the total investment on agro-wells and irrigation
pumps in 2000.
The incidence of agro-wells in the dry zone
has a relatively short history. The lined dug-well
was first reported in 1975 in a survey of major
schemes in Kurunegala, and in 1980 in a survey
of minor schemes, also in Kurunegala. However,
the diffusion of the lined dug-well became
significant only in the late 1980s. The tubewell
first appeared in 1980 in a minor scheme of the
Deduru Oya basin, and later in 1990s in other
minor schemes of the basin. The unlined dug-
well has an even shorter history of diffusion,
starting in the late 1980s.
The use of irrigation pumps has a much longer
history than agro-wells. Its adoption by individual
farmers in the sample schemes dates back to the
mid-1960s, but pumps owned by some agricultural
cooperatives were used for irrigation even earlier,
in the 1950s. Farmers say that a series of intense
drought periods around 1970 triggered the adoption
of irrigation pumps. As shown in figure 6, the
diffusion of the pump increased toward the mid-
1980s, and has been further accelerated since
then just as agro-wells have diffused.
It was specially after 1989 when the
government commenced the well subsidy
program that the investments in agro-wells and
pumps rose sharply. The impact of the subsidy
program is apparent in figure 6. The investments
in agro-wells and pumps showed rapid increases
again in the mid-1990s. However, the rate of
increase seems to have been declining since
then. Such trends have been brought about
mainly by the deceleration of the increase in
lined dug-wells and pumps.
TABLE 7.
Private investments in agro-wells and irrigation pumps in irrigation schemes in the dry zone of Sri Lanka,  in 1995 prices,
1965-2000.1
1
Estimated based on the data obtained in our survey.  - stands for none, and 0 carries some number below decimal point.
2Including subsidy.  Assuming 65% of lined dug-wells are subsidized for the amount of Rs 30,000 in 2000 prices, the total amount of subsidy
 is estimated to be as follows:
 1980  Rs 0.1 million (0.2%), 1985  Rs 3.2 million (4%), 1990  Rs 18.6 million (9%), 1995  Rs 32.9 million (10%), and  2000  Rs 58.9 million
 (12%),  where figures in parenthesis are the percentage of subsidy in the total investment on agro-wells and irrigation pumps.
Lined dug-well2 Unlined dug-well Tube-well Irrigation pump Total
Investment (Rs million)
1965 - - - 0 0
1970 - - - 2 2
1975 0 0 - 19 20
1980 0 0 0 26 26
1985 24 0 0 67 91
1990 158 0 1 159 318
1995 145 3 4 201 353
2000 296 8 7 224 53521
These findings seem to indicate that the
‘initial’ diffusion phase wherein the investments
increase at an explosive rate is over for lined
dug-wells and pumps, and the ‘matured’ phase is
on, wherein the investment is made just to
replace abandoned or retired agro-wells and
pumps so that their stock is kept constant. If the
need for their abandonment or replacement was
taken into account, the ‘working’ stock of lined
dug-wells and pumps, would have been found to
be increasing only slowly, if not decreasing.
34 In
contrast, the diffusion of unlined dug-wells and
tubewells appears to be still in its “initial”
phase.
35
How large are the private investments on
agro-wells and pumps when compared with the
public investments on irrigation? Starting from
nearly a negligible percentage share around
1970, the private irrigation investments now take
as much as 20 percent of the total irrigation
investments (table 1). A reason for the increasing
share of private investments in the last decade
and a half is the sharp decline in the total
investments, due, largely to the decline in the
investments in construction of new irrigation
schemes. However, the increase in the private
investments has indeed been significant. By the
mid-1990s, the private investments exceeded the
total O&M expenditure for the existing irrigation
schemes as a whole.
Rate of Return to Private Irrigation Rate of Return to Private Irrigation Rate of Return to Private Irrigation Rate of Return to Private Irrigation Rate of Return to Private Irrigation
Investments Investments Investments Investments Investments
Changes in cropping pattern with agro-wells Changes in cropping pattern with agro-wells Changes in cropping pattern with agro-wells Changes in cropping pattern with agro-wells Changes in cropping pattern with agro-wells
and pumps: and pumps: and pumps: and pumps: and pumps: As observed in table 6, more than
50 percent of agro-wells have been constructed
in the highland, and the rest in the command
area of irrigation schemes. It is also evident that
the main purpose of setting up agro-wells and
pumps by farmers is to irrigate OFCs. They use
ground water to irrigate paddy only occasionally
to supplement surface water.
In major and minor irrigation schemes alike,
the cropping pattern in the command area before
the adoption of agro-wells and pumps had been
simple; either paddy in maha and yala seasons
(major and minor cultivation seasons,
respectively) in case surface water is available in
both seasons, or paddy in maha and fallow in
yala in case surface water is available only in
maha season. The only difference between major
and minor schemes in this respect was that the
cropping intensity was generally higher in major
than in minor schemes; on average, 1.4 in major
schemes and 1.0 or even less in minor schemes.
The cropping intensity of less than 1.0 indicates
that surface water is not sufficient to plant paddy
in the entire command area even in maha
season. There were irrigation schemes where
OFCs were planted in yala season, but the
extent planted with OFCs was negligible in spite
of government efforts to promote crop
diversification.
The introduction of agro-wells and pumps
has changed this cropping pattern in the
command area to one with higher cropping
intensity through planting OFCs in the command
area hitherto left fallow in yala season. Popular
OFCs planted in the command with water from
agro-wells are chili, red and big onion, various
pulses, banana and many kinds of vegetables
such as eggplant, cucumber, okra, bitter gourd,
34As mentioned earlier, the abandonment ratio of lined dug-wells is at least 10 percent. Farmers insist that the usable life of an irrigation
pump is more than 10 years, often reaching as long as 30 years. Assuming a 15 year life time and straight-line depreciation, the rate of
depreciation is 6.6 percent. These rates can be compared to the investment-stock ratio in 2000 of lined dug-wells and of pumps, which is 13
percent and eight percent, respectively.
35Considering the rough nature of our estimation, however, further careful studies are required to confirm whether the diffusion of lined dug-
wells and pumps has reached the “matured” phase.22
36In the dry zone, an average farmer in major schemes cultivates 0.97 ha of lowland and 0.16 ha of highland, while an average farmer in
minor schemes cultivates 0.48 ha of lowland and 1.05 ha of highland (Kikuchi et al. 2001).
37For details, see Kikuchi et al. (2001).
brinjals, etc. Paddy is rarely selected as a yala
season crop to be irrigated by well water.
Crops grown on the highland part of
irrigation schemes differ between major and
minor schemes, as the size of highland is
different. On the small highland area in major
schemes, even from the times before the
introduction of agro-wells, farmers have been
planting OFCs in maha season, similar to those
OFCs they plant in the command in yala season
with well water. The much larger tract of highland
in minor schemes has typically been planted in
maha season with such crops as kurakkan,
maize and tobacco, in addition to the OFCs
planted in major schemes. It was common in
major and minor schemes that almost no
cultivation was done on the highland during yala
season before the adoption of the agro-well and
pump—without irrigation, it is difficult to grow
crops in yala season under the climatic
conditions of the dry zone. The only exception
was gingelly, planted in yala season, only on a
small part of the highland, particularly in minor
schemes.
With agro-wells and pumps, the cropping
pattern in the highland in yala season has
changed significantly in both major and minor
schemes. Fallow or extensive cultivation with
gingelly has been replaced by intensive OFC
cultivation in the area irrigated by well water. The
area irrigable with a set of well and pump being
around 0.20 ha to 0.81 ha, an average major
scheme farmer owning an agro-well in the
highland may be able to irrigate the entire extent
of his highland. By contrast, the cropping
intensity in yala season for an average minor
scheme farmer may range from 20 percent to 80
percent.
36 The list of OFCs planted with well
water in the highland in yala season largely
overlaps the list of OFCs in the command area.
Certainly, the similarity between the OFCs
planted with well water in major schemes and
minor schemes, using agro-wells, and across
river basins and other regions is remarkable. Of
the OFCs irrigated by pumped-up water from
agro-wells, rivers, canals and tanks, a few crops
are listed in annex table a-7 to depict the
irrigation performance.
Cost of well and pump installation: Cost of well and pump installation: Cost of well and pump installation: Cost of well and pump installation: Cost of well and pump installation: The cost
of digging agro-wells varies significantly,
depending not only on the type of well but also
on the depth of the well, among various other
factors. In the following section, we show the
costs of well and pump installation in year 2000
prices.
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The simplest case is the unlined, open dug-
well. It is dug by using a machine shovel (locally
called ‘bako’). As long as the well is not too
deep, the digging is quite easy, taking only a few
hours to finish. Unlike a lined one, however, it is
necessary to make additional digging or de-
silting using a machine shovel every three years
or so. It is estimated that the digging cost
increases progressively as a well becomes
deeper. At the mean depth of 16 ft (4.9 m), the
digging cost is estimated to be Rs 6,500. For our
cost-benefit analysis, let us assume this level as
the construction cost of an unlined well. The
additional digging cost per year is assumed to
be Rs 580, based on the information obtained
from farmers in our survey.
The method to dig a lined dug-well is the
same as for an unlined one. After digging by
machine shovel, in this case, the wall of the well
is trimmed into a cylindrical shape and lined
manually, using bricks and cement. In case the
depth of the well is beyond the reach of the23
machine shovel, further excavation is done
manually, using hoes, shovels and iron stick
bars. It is estimated that the digging cost
increases progressively as a well becomes
deeper, while the lining cost is estimated to be
proportional to the depth of the well. With the
typical depth of 20 ft (6.1 m), the cost of digging
and lining is estimated to be Rs 35,000 and Rs
45,000, respectively, totaling up to Rs 80,000. If
the depth becomes 40 ft, the total cost could
become as high as Rs 230,000. For cost-benefit
analysis, let us assume these levels for lined
dug-wells.
A tubewell is installed by using a drilling
(boring) machine. The boring cost depends on
the diameter of the well as well as the depth. In
Kalpitiya, it takes only 2 to 6 hours to drill a
tubewell, 6 inch diameter and 25 ft deep, with
the total cost of Rs7,700. In the Deduru Oya
basin, a tubewell, 4-inch diameter and 24 ft
deep, can be installed within a day at a total cost
as cheap as Rs 6,600, of which Rs 4,300 is the
machine rental for boring and Rs 2,300 is the
cost of the 4-inch tube and labor.
38 In the case of
tubewells too, the boring cost increases as the
depth of the well becomes more, but the rate of
cost escalation is much less than in the case of
lined dug-well; the boring cost of a tubewell, 60
ft deep, is estimated to be Rs 18,250. In this
study, let us assume the installation cost as Rs
6,600 for the typical tubewell, 4-inch diameter
and 24 ft deep, and Rs 30,200 for a tubewell, 4-
inch diameter and 60 ft deep.
Farmers use pumps of various sizes to lift
water from agro-wells, rivers, canals and tanks.
The most typical pump is the 2-inch one with a
diesel engine of 3 to 4 HP. Let us assume that
the 3.5 HP pump costing Rs 32,000 to be the
typical pump used by farmers. Operation and
maintenance costs of a diesel pump are
estimated by assuming a fuel efficiency of 1-hour
operation per 1 liter of diesel, and 3 liters of oil
per crop season for greasing, with a unit price of
Rs 15 and Rs 100 per liter, respectively.
39
Except when distributing pumped-up water
from paddy to paddy, farmers use plastic pipes,
usually of 2 inch diameter, for water distribution
to their fields. Typically, the total length of the
pipe necessary for distributing water from a dug-
well to irrigate OFCs in a field of about 0.81 ha
is 200 ft, costing Rs 6,400. In the case of lifting
water from rivers, canals and tanks, the length of
the pipe may have to be much longer. A farmer
in the Kirindi Oya basin uses a 2-inch pipe,
1,200 ft long (cost Rs 38,400) to distribute water
from the river to his fields.
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Rates of return to well and pump investment: Rates of return to well and pump investment: Rates of return to well and pump investment: Rates of return to well and pump investment: Rates of return to well and pump investment:
Let us assess the rate of return to farmers’
investments on various types of agro-well and
irrigation pump by estimating the internal rate of
return (IRR) that satisfies the formula:
38In the Kirindi Oya scheme of the southern dry zone, it costs only Rs 3,900 to install a tubewell, 6 inch diameter and 30 ft deep.
39Farmers in Kalpitiya use electric motors of 1.5 to 2 HP for pumping up water from tubewells. It is assumed that the price of a 1.5 HP electric
motor is Rs 14,500, and the running cost is Rs 3,000 for electricity (2.5 months of operation).
40In Kalpitiya, farmers install underground 2-inch pipe networks to irrigate OFCs in the upland of around 0.81 ha, with a total length of about
200 ft. Including labor for the installation of the network, the total investment on this pipe network amounts to Rs 3,600.24
C=Σi=1
n (R–c) / (1+r)
i = (R–c) {[(1+r)




C = investment cost on the well and pump,
R = increase in gross value-added or in farmers’
net income due to the investment,
c = operation and maintenance cost of the well/
pump,
r = internal rate of return, and
n = the usable life of the well/pump (assumed
to be 15 years).
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R is estimated by deducting the income
(gross-value added = the total output value less
the current input costs) accruing from crops
grown before the introduction of the well and
pump, from the income accruing from new crops
after the introduction. Farmers’ net income is
obtained by deducting capital depreciation of the
well and pump, from the farmers’ gross income
defined as total output value less paid-out costs.
The rate of return based on the increase in gross
value-added can be considered as the social
rate of return, while the rate of return based on
increase in farmers’ net income is the private
rate of return.
Table 8 summarizes the results of estimation
that are made for eight different cases. Since
water from wells is almost always lifted using
pumps, the estimation is made for the
investment in a set of an agro-well and pump,
except the 7th case of only a pump for water
from the river. Both social as well as private
rates of return are shown in the table. The
investment on the well and pump is made by
farmers, and their investment decision depends
on the private rate of return to the investment. To
the extent that the return to farmers diverges
from the return to society, the two rates of return
become different. Criteria for judging whether
investments on the well and pump are
economically viable are therefore different for
farmers and society. A criterion popularly
adopted for public irrigation investments is
whether their IRR exceeds 10 percent, a typical
interest rate adopted for public international
loans, and thus considered as a measure of
opportunity cost to society of such funds for
public investments.
First, It should be noted that all the
estimated social IRRs in table 8 far exceed this
threshold interest rate, which indicates that
investments in agro- wells and pumps generate
benefits to society, even in the case of the
lowest level of IRR. Compared to the IRRs of
public irrigation investments in table 4, the social
rates of return to farmers’ investments on agro-
wells and pumps are apparently superior. The
social IRRs for private investments, in particular,
are definitely higher than the IRR for new
irrigation construction investment. In terms of
figure 1, curve W representing the investments
on agro-wells and pumps is clearly positioned
below curve I. Moreover, the social IRRs of well-
pump investments considerably exceed the IRRs
of major rehabilitation projects. It is impressive
that the IRR of the Gal Oya project, the most
successful major rehabilitation project of Sri
Lanka, or may be of the entire developing world,
is nearly at the same level as the lowest social
IRR among the cases listed in table 8.
Furthermore, farmers’ private investments under
favorable conditions dominate even the IRRs of
very successful water management projects.
High social rates of return, however, do not
necessarily mean that the well- pump
investments are satisfactorily profitable to
farmers. Farmers’ investment criteria must be the
opportunity cost to them, not to society at large,
41Fifteen-year life span of the dug-well, tubewell and the pump may sound too long, particularly for the pump. However, in many cases, farm-
ers have been using irrigation pumps for more than 20 years.25
of their investment funds. If farmers mobilize
investment funds from their own savings,
opportunity cost of the funds might be the interest
rate of commercial banks’ on saving deposits,
which is about 12 percent per year. If farmers have
to finance the funds by borrowing from someone,
the rate of return from their investment must
exceed the interest rate of that borrowing. There
are numerous lending sources from government
lending institutions, commercial banks and various
informal moneylenders—though sources available
to farmers are rather limited.
The typical interest rate of development
loans for which the government gives
concessions is 12 to 20 percent per year.
Because of the difficulty in providing collateral,
commercial bank loans which require collateral
(at interest rates of 15-25 percent per year) are
not readily available to farmers. It may neither be
too difficult, but not so easy, for farmers to obtain
loans without collateral from commercial banks
at interest rates of 25 to 35 percent per year.
Successful credit cooperatives in rural areas are
not so many in number, but, they offer loans to
farmers at the interest rate of 2 to 2.5 percent
per month, or 27 to 34 percent per year. Informal
lending sources are easily accessible to farmers
in rural areas, but their interest rates are as high
as 5 to 10 percent per month, or 80 to 200
percent per year.
42 Such a setting in rural
42It is not rare to find in rural areas, informal loans that are really usurious, with interest rates of 20 percent per month, or 800 percent per
year, but these high-interest loans are usually for consumption purposes.
Specifications IRR (%)1
Well Pump2
Lined/ Diameter Depth Crop3 Social Private With
    Unlined        grown    subsidy
1 Dug-well+pump Lined 20 ft 20 ft4 2" diesel 3.5HP B onion (No. 1) 56 37 49
2 Dug-well+pump Lined 20 ft 30 ft4 2" diesel 3.5HP B onion (No.1) 24 9 11
3 Dug-well+pump Unlined 20 ft 16 ft5 2" diesel 3.5HP B onion (No.1) 147 107 -
4 Tube-well+pump - 4" 24 ft6 2" diesel 3.5HP B onion (No.1) 154 114 -
5 Tube-well+pump - 5" 60 ft7 2" diesel 3.6HP B onion (No.1) 112 81 -
6 Tube-well+pump - 4" 24 ft6 2" diesel 3.5HP Rice (No.2) 36 20 -
7 Pump (river-lift) - - - 2" diesel 3.5HP R onion (No.3) 137 110 -
8 Tube-well+pump - 6" 25 ft7 2" electric 1.5HP R onion (No.4) 588 460 -
1 Social rate of return based on gross value added and private rate of return based on increase in farmers’ income. ‘With subsidy’ is the
private rate of return with government subsidy for dug-well of Rs 30,000.
2
Price of pump: Rs 32,000 for Kubota/Robin, and Rs 14,500 for electric motor. Also assume that for cases 1 through 5, 200 ft long 2"plastic
pipe (Rs 32/ft except case 7, Rs 13/ft for case 7) is used for water distribution to fields, and 1,200 ft 2"plastic tube (Rs 32/ft) for Case 6. Fuel
consumption of a diesel pump is assumed to be 1 l (Rs 15/l) for 1 hr operation, and 4 l of oil (Rs 120/l) are required per season.
3
For details, see annex table a-7. Number in ( ) refers to the row in appendix table a-7. For cases 1 through 7, assume gingelly
(No. 5 in annex table A-7) as the crop grown under the rainefed condition.
4 The cost of digging and lining of a dug-well is Rs 80,000 for 20 ft and Rs 230,000 for 40 ft.
5
The digging cost of unlined dug-well: Rs 6,500. Including the cost of 200 ft of 2" pipe for water distribution, the total cost is Rs 12,900.
Additional digging cost of Rs 1,750 required every three years is included as a part of operation and maintenance cost.
6 The digging cost: Rs 13,000, including the cost of 200 ft of 2" pipe for water distribution.
7
The digging cost: Rs 11,300, including the installation cost of under-ground water distribution system using 200 ft long 2"plastic pipe.
TABLE 8.
Internal rate of return (IRR) for various types of well-pump investment26
financial markets suggests that the opportunity
cost of investment funds to farmers ranges from
12 percent upward. Depending on the financial
markets that farmers actually have, the threshold
interest rate could be 12, 20, 30, 80 percent, or
even higher. Faced with these higher interest
rates, these investments are less attractive to
farmers than for society at large.
In table 8, the first two cases refer to the
investment in a lined dug-well and pump. The
difference between the two cases lies in the
depth of the well—20 ft for case 1, and 40 ft for
case 2. For the lined dug-well 20 ft deep, the
private IRR is 37 percent, lower than the social
IRR by 20 percent. Even if the high risk inherent
in the well investment and in OFC cultivation is
taken into consideration, it could be said that this
level of rate of return to farmers is sufficiently
high to make repayment on loans without
collateral extended from commercial banks
possible. If we take into account the subsidy
given for the lined dug-well of Rs 30,000,
43 the
private IRR increases to nearly 50 percent. The
depth of the great majority of lined dug-wells is
20 ft or less, which means that the private IRR
with subsidy is higher than this level in many
cases. Such decently high rates of return to
farmers explain the great proliferation of lined
dug-wells in the Northwestern part of the dry
zone in the last decade.
As mentioned earlier, however, the cost of
digging a lined dug-well increases progressively
as it becomes deeper. This means that the
economic viability of lined dug-wells decreases
quickly as it becomes deeper. If the depth of a
dug-well is 40 ft, the social IRR decreases to 24
percent and the private IRR to 9 percent. The
investment is still economically viable to society,
but the incentive for farmers to make this
investment is lost. The subsidy recovers the
private rate of return only at 11 percent, which is
below the threshold level of 12 percent. With
high risks associated with well investments and
OFC cultivation, this level of private profitability
would scarcely warrant investing in this
opportunity. It should be mentioned that the
benefit of dug-wells and pumps is estimated for
cases with very favorable groundwater
conditions. For less favorable cases, the
economic performance of this well-pump
investment could be far less than the level
assumed here. In such cases, even the
economic viability to society could easily be lost.
Such findings are consistent with our
observation that there is no lined dug-well
deeper than 40 ft, and that there are many lined
dug-wells left unused. At least one out of ten
lined dug-wells in the dry zone, including the
northwestern part of the dry zone, are in an
abandoned state, and in some irrigation schemes
50 percent to 100 percent of wells are unused.
On the other hand, the number of lined dug-wells
has been increasing. These incidences suggest
that, while investments in the lined dug-well can
attain a decent level of rate of return in areas
with favorable groundwater conditions, there are
many other areas where the use of lined dug-
wells is not economically feasible, socially or
privately. The relatively low level of economic
performance of the lined dug-well and pump thus
underlies the observation that the “initial”
diffusion phase of the lined dug-well and pump
was over, giving in to the “matured” phase.
Case 3 in table 8 refers to the unlined dug-
well with pump, typically found in some parts of
Mahaweli system H and some other major
irrigation schemes in the Kala Oya basin, and
case 4, to the tubewell with pump, typically found
in minor irrigation schemes in the Deduru Oya
basin. The investment in the well and pump in
these cases is highly profitable; not only the
social IRRs but also the private IRRs are more
43The government subsidy per lined dug-well since 1999. It was Rs 15,000 for 1989-91 and Rs 20,000 for 1992-98.27
than 100 percent. Case 5 shows that the private
IRR is still as high as 81 percent for a tubewell
60 ft deep. Even if the risks are taken into
account, these levels of private IRRs would be
sufficient to induce farmers who have only the
informal money market to invest in the well and
pump. Such high rates of return to farmers have
been behind the rapid diffusion of unlined dug-
wells and tubewells in the northwestern part of
the dry zone entirely on the farmers’ initiative
and with no government intervention.
It is interesting to observe that case 6, which
is same as case 4, except that the crop grown is
paddy, gives results greatly inferior to those of
case 4. Similar results are obtained, if estimated
for the case of the unlined dug-well with rice as
the crop to be grown. It should be noted that the
level of the rice yield assumed in this estimation
is 5.2 t per hectare (100 bushels per acre),
which is about 50 percent higher than the
average yield in minor irrigation schemes, or 10
percent higher than the technology level NIV
N=140 assumed for the public irrigation
investment cases.
44 Even with such a high yield
level, the IRRs are far less impressive than
those with high-value OFCs. Such estimation
results are due partly to the low paddy price at
present, and also the heavy water requirement
for paddy cultivation. As the possibility of
conjunctive use of well and surface water
becomes less, the IRR for rice declines quickly.
This is the main factor that underlies the fact that
the overwhelming majority of farmers use the
well-pump water for OFC cultivation rather than
for rice cultivation.
Case 7 examines the economic
performance of the pump as used for lifting
water from rivers, canals and tanks for OFC
cultivation. Investment costs being cheap, the
private IRR is high enough to induce farmers’
investment. As long as a sufficient amount of
water is available within a reasonable distance
for pumping up, farmers would always be
tempted to invest in the pump.
The final case is for the tubewell and the
power-operated pump in Kalpitiya, Puttalam.
On the one hand, investment and running
costs, including the well digging, the electric
motor and electricity for operation, are the
cheapest among the cases examined in table
8. On the other hand, plentiful groundwater
supplied from the shallow coastal sand
aquifers in the area (Panabokke u.d.) enables
farmers to grow high value-added OFCs such
as red onion, three times a year, with a high
income. The combined result is extremely high
rates of return on the investment.
45,46
Future Prospects Future Prospects Future Prospects Future Prospects Future Prospects
The private rates of return to the investments on
agro-wells and pumps are thus sufficiently high
to induce farmers’ to invest, even if high
opportunity costs to farmers are taken into
account, except in the case of very deep lined
dug-wells. The high social profitability of the well-
pump investments is therefore realized through
private investments that characterize phase III of
irrigated agriculture development.
44This 10 percent yield margin may be considered as the yield-enhancing effect of conjunctive water use for rice production.
45It should be noted that in the Kalpitiya case, only one-third of the gross value-added or income is taken into account as the return to the
investment on the tubewell and electric pump, with the rest two-thirds assumed to be foregone. Should there be no foregone income, the
private IRR of the investment on the tubewell and electric pump in Kalpitiya would exceed 1000 percent with a wide margin.
46As far as we observed in our survey, the use of electricity as the source of power for lifting water in the dry zone is confined to Kalpitiya.
This virtual nonexistence of the electricity-operated pump in irrigation schemes in the dry zone of Sri Lanka is in sharp contrast to the situa-
tion in India where the use of electricity, which is heavily subsidized by the government, has facilitated the diffusion of agro-wells and pumps
considerably in the last two decades (Shah 1993).28
The investments on the unlined dug-well, the
tubewell and the pump to lift surface water
generate very high private rates of return. The
estimates suggest that these devices have
profound prospects for further diffusion. The
diffusion of the lined dug-well that has the lowest
rate of return out of the three types of agro-wells,
would continue, but only in areas with favorable
groundwater conditions that allow the depth to be
as shallow as 20 ft or even less. Unlined-dug-
wells and tubewells, on account of their high
performance which can replace lined dug-wells,
will become the dominant types of agro-well
even in areas with favorable groundwater
conditions. In particular, it is the tubewell that
would have the highest potential for future
diffusion, because of its low boring cost even
with deeper aquifers.
A distinct feature of agro-wells in Sri Lanka
when compared to other South Asian
counterparts is their shallowness resulting in the
use of small-sized pumps and thus, the small
size of the irrigable area for a set of an agro-well
and a pump. This may be related to groundwater
conditions set by the topographical and
hydrological conditions specific to the dry zone
of Sri Lanka. In any case, groundwater aquifers
from which agro-wells get water are closely
associated with the flow of surface water along
respective river basins and within respective
irrigation schemes. To the extent that these two
sources of water are related to each other, the
conjunctive use of surface and groundwater
would increase the need for integrated
management of the water sources for irrigated
agriculture to be sustainable. Unlike in other
South Asian countries, there have hitherto been
few reports that agro-well development leads to
the overt depletion of groundwater. For the
conjunctive use of water to be efficient and
equitable, however, the basin-wide joint
management of and control over surface and
groundwater would become increasingly
necessary.
It should be noted in this connection that the
proliferation of agro-wells and pumps that give
farmers more discretion over water use would
enhance their individualistic behavior. However,
the promotion of farmers’ involvement in O&M of
irrigation schemes, by fostering their
organizations, through their cooperation and
collective action, has been a state policy. Striking
a good balance between these two opposite
vectors for the development of irrigated
agriculture would be an important policy issue in
the future.
Concluding Remarks Concluding Remarks Concluding Remarks Concluding Remarks Concluding Remarks
The total investment in the irrigation sector in Sri
Lanka had been declining sharply since the early
1980s toward the mid-1990s. Within this period
of a decade and half, the total investment has
shrunk in real terms to a level that is one fifth of
the peak level in the early 1980s. Since there
had been no private irrigation investment until
the mid-1990s, the decline in the total irrigation
investment is due to the decline in public
irrigation investment. Out of the three types of
public investment, new irrigation construction has
recorded the sharpest decline. Although the
percentage share of rehabilitation investment in
the total irrigation investment has increased, its
absolute amount had declined since the mid-
1980s up to the mid-1990s. The O&M
expenditures were stagnant in the last two
decades, or even declining since the mid-1980s.
For the total irrigated area that had increased by
25 percent or by 0.1 million hectare during this29
period, the O&M expenditures per ha of irrigated
area declined considerably.
In the last half decade, the total irrigation
investment has shown a slight upward trend from
the low the irrigation sector had reached in the
early 1990s. However, the relative composition of
investments is entirely different from what
existed before the early 1990s. Investment in
irrigation rehabilitation has increased and taken
the largest share in the total irrigation
investment, while investment on new irrigation
construction has continued to shrink and given
the top-share position to irrigation rehabilitation
for the first time in the history of the irrigation
sector. Also remarkable are the rapid increases
in private irrigation investment. The investment
on agro-wells and irrigation pumps by farmers
was negligible until the end of the 1980s, but
was increasing rapidly in the 1990s, exceeding
the O&M expenditure for the entire major
irrigation schemes by a wide margin.
The estimation of the rates of return to public
irrigation investments reconfirms that phase II of
the development in irrigated agriculture, that is,
the phase of new irrigation construction by the
public sector, was over by the early 1980s in Sri
Lanka. The sharp decline in investment in new
irrigation construction has been brought about by
the drastic drop in the profitability of this type of
investment. The sharply rising cost of new
irrigation construction in real terms has been a
major factor that choked off the incentive to
invest in new irrigation construction. The low rice
price since the collapse of the commodity boom
in the mid-1980s certainly encouraged the
government and international donor agencies to
shy away from the investment in new irrigation
construction. Though very drastic, the reduction
in new construction investment is what is
expected to occur once phase II is over.
During the entire phase II, irrigation systems
were administered, not managed. The entry into
phase III signals the higher profitability for
investment in management and control of water
deliveries and therefore greater emphasis on
software as opposed to hardware. High
profitability of some major rehabilitation and
water management improvement projects
implemented in the 1980s attests that the
irrigation sector has been in phase III, that is, the
phase of rehabilitation and water management.
But, some other projects of this type have
revealed economic performance that is far less
than expected. Such results suggest that
deliberate project design and implementation
with due attention to software and institutional
focus are a prerequisite for this type of irrigation
project—if they are to realize their economic
potential. In particular for major rehabilitation
projects, there is a strong need to develop more
cost-effective methods/approaches of improving
physical structures in order to reduce the unit
capital cost.
Poor performance seems to have been one
of the factors leading to a decline in investment
in rehabilitation projects toward the mid-1990s.
This is not a trend that we expect to observe in
phase III, and indeed this declining trend has
been reversed in the last half decade. A rough
estimation of the investment needs for
rehabilitation indicates that the rate of under-
investment in this respect is 25 percent at
present, but the rate of under-investment was as
high as 60 percent in the early 1990s.
More serious is the declining trend of O&M
intensity. The negligence of and under-
investment in O&M have been a chronic problem
ever since the irrigation sector entered the phase
of new constructions. In the phase of water
management, this problem had become rather
less serious—O&M intensity has recently been
declining even beyond the level attained in 1980
when the irrigation sector was at the peak of
new constructions. In spite of the very high rate
of return on adequate O&M, the rate of under-
investment is estimated to be 60 percent at
present. Considering the difficulties in
implementing effective O&M, the degree of
under-investment at the system level could be
even more serious than this estimate indicates.30
Discrepancies between the potentially high
profitability and the trends in public investments
actually realized for rehabilitation and O&M in
phase III indicate a compelling need to improve
the way rehabilitation projects and O&M activities
are designed and implemented. Cost-effective
methods for system rehabilitation and O&M with
improvements in physical/ engineering as well as
institutional aspects must be pursued. Most
important among others would be to establish an
effective incentive system that ensures the
realization of large potential benefits of
rehabilitation/modernization projects, and
particularly, of adequate O&M.
47 The Sri Lankan
government is seeking to achieve this through
greater involvement of user groups in O&M, but
the impact of the program to date has been
modest (Samad and Vermillion 1999).
Many other rice-growing countries in Asia
face the same problems due to low rice prices
and rising construction costs. The gradual
deterioration of the existing irrigation schemes,
which is an inevitable result under this situation,
may precipitate conditions for a food crisis in the
near future. The sudden rise of world rice price
due to such crises would call for funds to the
irrigation sector for crash projects. But, we have
already seen many crash irrigation projects
accompanied by unnecessary waste in the
decade following the food crises in the 1970s.
Meanwhile, the poor performance and
gradual deterioration of existing irrigation
schemes have spurred a revolution in
groundwater development. An increasing number
of farmers have been installing agro-wells and
irrigation pumps in the command and the
highland; it is estimated that about 10 percent of
farmers in irrigation schemes own agro-wells and
about 15 percent, irrigation pumps. High rates of
return, socially as well as privately, on
investments in agro-wells and pumps have
encouraged their rapid diffusion, making the
private investments as major options in phase III
of irrigated agriculture. Large potentials exist for
further diffusion of agro-wells and pumps in
irrigation schemes.
Agro-wells and pumps give farmers more
discretion over water use, promote diversification
to high-value crops, and thereby increase
farmers’ income. The diffusion of well-pumps has
had a positive impact. Productivity improvements
in the irrigation sector, expected in phase III of
irrigated agriculture development, have been
attained largely by private irrigation investments
in agro-wells and irrigation pumps, and not by
public irrigation investments/expenditures. But
one needs to be cautious of being overly
optimistic of the beneficial effects of agro-wells.
The current analysis shows that under prevailing
conditions, the returns on investments in agro-
wells are sufficiently high to attract private
investments in this sector. However, future
events may change the incentive structure.
Investments in agro-wells are almost exclusively
for OFC cultivation. At present, due to civil
unrest, only limited amounts of OFC cultivated in
the Northern Province, especially the Jaffna
peninsula —a traditional area producing other
field crops—enter the local market. With the
return of peace, there is a strong likelihood of
OFCs produced in the North entering a saturated
market and thereby depressing their prices.
Furthermore, there is the likelihood of cheap
imports of competing crops from India under the
South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), if it
becomes effective. Unless there is a major
change in the portfolio of crops grown under
agro-wells, these events could affect new
investment in agro-wells and curtail the diffusion
of agrowells.
47It is difficult to institute an effective incentive system by which the potential benefits can be internalized. Breaking the vicious circle between
deferred maintenance (negligence of O&M) and early rehabilitation, cost sharing by beneficiaries of rehabilitation projects, and performance-
linked subsidy for O&M by beneficiaries are some examples of many possibilities.31
The shallowness of agro-wells is a salient
feature of the agro-well “revolution” in Sri
Lanka, which suggests that groundwater
aquifers are closely associated with the flow of
surface water in river basins and irrigation
schemes. To the extent that these two water
sources are related to each other, the
conjunctive use of surface and groundwater
would demand integrated management of the
water sources, for irrigated agriculture to be
sustainable. Unlike in other South Asian
countries, there have thus far been few reports
that agro-well development leads to the overt
depletion of groundwater. No institutional
coordination between surface water and
groundwater development has hitherto existed,
and the largely unregulated installation of
private agro-wells could lead to over-
exploitation and increased pollution, as has
been the case in many parts of Asia. For the
conjunctive use of water to be efficient and
equitable, the basin-wide joint management of
and control of surface and groundwater would
become increasingly necessary.
Development of irrigation in phase III in Sri
Lanka should involve a two pronged approach.
First, the government should vigorously pursue its
plans to devolve greater responsibility for O&M on
user groups, while providing sufficient resources.
This process of farmers’ greater involvement in
O&M and other management aspects of irrigation
schemes have to be in harmony with the agro-well
“revolution” that is essentially the work of the
individual farmer. It would be one of the most
important challenges for the irrigation sector to find
out feasible ways for the integrated management of
surface and groundwater at the system level.
Second, the government must adopt new policies
and develop new institutional mechanisms for
allocating water between agricultural and non-
agricultural use at the river basin level and also for
regulating basin-level development of surface and
groundwater irrigation at a macro-level. These
steps are required to achieve higher productivity
and sustainability of irrigated agriculture, assuring
that irrigation remains the backbone of rural and
agricultural development in the future too, just as it
has been in the past.
48
48Phase III in Sri Lanka coincides with the attainment of self-sufficiency in rice. At this stage of development, the pressure is mounting for the
rice sector of the country to be competitive in the world rice market (Barker and Samad 1999). In order to sustain the sector, it is required to
increase the productivity of rice production rather than the total rice production at a sufficiently rapid rate, It is the irrigation sector that takes
the brunt in attaining this target.3233
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Annex table a-1.
Domestic production, Imports, and domestic and import price of rice, 1949-97, Sri Lanka.
Price of ricec
Rice Rice Self- Domestic World
productiona importb sufficiency price priced
1000 mt 1000 mt in rice % Rs/mt Rs/mt
(1) (2) (1)/((1)+(2)) (3) (4)
1949 317 602 34 433
1950 303 744 29 422
1951 459 600 43 445
1952 603 606 50 616
1953 457 612 43 680 604
1954 649 601 52 560 525
1955 745 575 56 540 445
1956 561 734 43 550 411
1957 653 781 46 540 376
1958 764 720 51 550 376
1959 759 871 47 550 365
1960 897 789 53 550 354
1961 899 700 56 550 354
1962 1,001 613 62 510 365
1963 1,026 602 63 510 365
1964 1,054 983 52 510 376
1965 757 419 64 540 399
1966 953 1,035 48 529 408
1967 1,145 511 69 652 570
1968 1,346 552 71 760 691
1969 1,374 461 75 729 583
1970 1,616 716 69 712 462
1971 1,396 440 76 693 354
1972 1,312 446 75 712 390
1973 1,312 507 72 1,162 575
1974 1,602 444 78 1,975 1,762
1975 1,154 693 62 2,005 1,325
1976 1,253 563 69 1,791 1,148
1977 1,676 803 68 1,688 1,289
1978 1,890 278 87 1,952 3,106
1979 1,917 315 86 2,014 2,880
1980 2,133 251 89 2,455 3,936
1981 2,229 250 90 3,229 5,008
1982 2,155 259 89 3,407 3,254
1983 2,483 219 92 3,542 3,556
Continued34
a) In rough rice.
b) In rough rice equivalent.
c) Farm-gate price of rough rice or rough rice equivalent.
d) The price of Thai 25% broken converted to rough rice at the farm-gate in Sri Lanka.
Sources: (1) For 1949-89, Aluwihare and Kikuchi (1991); for 1990-97, Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Review of Economy, various issues.
(2) Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Review of Economy, various issues.
(3) For 1953-65, IRRI, World Rice Statistics; for 1966-95, FAOSTAT; for 1996-97, DA’s Cost of Cultivation of Agricultural Crops.
(4) Kikuchi et al. (2002).
Self- Price of ricec
Rice Rice sufficiency Domestic World
productiona importb in rice price priced
1000 mt 1000 mt % Rs/mt Rs/mt
(1) (2) (1)/((1)+(2)) (3) (4)
1984 2,420 57 98 3,600 3,681
1985 2,661 314 89 3,900 3,392
1986 2,586 344 88 3,960 3,220
1987 2,128 168 93 4,160 3,797
1988 2,477 313 89 4,250 4,937
1989 2,064 471 81 5,660 6,478
1990 2,538 256 91 7,330 6,171
1991 2,389 198 92 7,230 6,228
1992 2,340 353 87 8,060 6,373
1993 2,570 311 89 8,200 6,775
1994 2,684 86 97 7,980 8,844
1995 2,810 13 100 7,760 8,078
1996 2,062 508 80 10,525 9,107
1997 2,239 456 83 9,016 8,425
1998 2,692 250 91 9,226
1999 2,868  319  90   8,284
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Annex table a-2.
Fertilizer use, nitrogen price and modern variety ratio, 1950-97, Sri Lanka
Fertilizera          Modern variety ratiod
Total Fertilizer Fertilizer           Nitrogen price Old New Total
fertilizer for use per Domestic Farm-gate improved improved
consumption rice unit area farm-gate equivalent varieties varieties
sownb price world pricec
1,000 mt 1,000 mt kg/ha Rs/kg Rs/kg % % %
(1) (2)  (3) (4) (4) (5) (6)
1950 31 0.3 1 na na 0 0 0
1951 33 0.6 1 na na 0 0 0
1952 29 0.8 2 na na 0 0 0
1953 45 1.7 4 na na 0 0 0
1954 48 2.3 5 na na 0 0 0
1955 53 3.0 6 na na 0 0 0
1956 81 5.3 11 na na 0 0 0
1957 50 3.8 8 na na 0 0 0
1958 47 4.0 7 1.95 na 2 0 2
1959 68 7.4 14 1.53 na 7 0 7
1960 70 5.5 9 1.20 na 15 0 15
1961 75 7.7 13 0.62 1.5 18 0 18
1962 79 10.2 16 0.61 1.5 22 0 22
1963 84 12.2 19 0.64 1.2 30 0 30
1964 92 15.8 29 0.76 1.5 41 0 41
1965 87 11.4 19 0.93 1.6 42 0 42
1966 91 13.9 21 0.88 1.5 48 0 48
1968 107 24.5 35 0.94 1.4 60 2 62
1969 102 29.2 42 0.89 1.1 67 4 71
1970 105 31.9 42 0.89 1.0 62 9 71
1971 112 38.8 54 0.89 0.9 54 12 66
1972 100 38.8 54 0.97 1.2 51 18 69
1973 111 53.1 73 1.17 2.1 34 39 73
1974 110 42.9 53 2.23 7.3 25 55 80
1975 72 22.7 33 4.40 4.8 32 49 81
1976 95 33.3 46 2.19 3.3 22 60 82
1977 112 54.6 66 3.86 3.9 21 63 84
1978 140 61.5 71 2.90 7.8 22 63 85
1979 137 58.3 69 2.13 9.3 18 65 83
1980 169 84.9 100 4.65 12.7 15 69 84
1981 144 70.5 80 4.65 14.3 13 74 87
1982 155 77.1 91 6.05 11.4 9 89 98
1983 162 74.9 91 6.20 11.0 7 92 99
1984 188 86.6 87 6.62 15.0 6 93 99
1985 195 94.6 107 6.62 12.7 6 93 99
1986 200 108.9 122 6.80 10.3 5 86 91
Continued36
a) Total nutrients (N+P+K).
b) Total nutrients used for rice divided by area planted with rice.
c) Estimated from the world price of Urea (FOB in Europe) assuming 28% of freight and insurance between the port of origin and the Colombo
Port and 25% of margin for transport and handling between the Colombo port and the farm-gate.
d) Ratio of area planted with modern varieties to total area planted with rice.
Sources: (1) and (2)  IRRI and National Fertilizer Secretariat, The Review of Fertilizer, various issues.
(3) IRRI and Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Economic and Social Statistics of Sri Lanka, various issues.
(4) Basic data for 1961-95 from IRRI (1995) and for 1996-97 from Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report 1997.
(5)-(7) Rice Breeding Center of the Department of Agriculture.
Fertilizera          Modern variety ratiod
Total Fertilizer Fertilizer           Nitrogen price Old New Total
fertilizer for use per Domestic Farm-gate improved improved
consumption rice unit area farm-gate equivalent varieties varieties
sownb price world pricec
1,000 mt 1,000 mt kg/ha Rs/kg Rs/kg % % %
(1) (2)  (3) (4) (4) (5) (6)
1987 207 101.7 130 6.58 11.9 5 85 90
1988 207 104.2 120 6.06 17.0 3 82 85
1989 205 111.0 153 6.54 16.4 3 87 90
1990 171 75.7 88 7.55 21.7 3 89 92
1991 177 81.6 100 16.53 24.6 1 49 50
1992 184 93.8 117 20.91 20.0 0 31 31
1993 213 110.5 132 21.50 18.9 1 90 92
1994 214 122.5 132 21.41 20.5 3 90 92
1995 207 118.5 130 19.78 27.6 2 97 99
1996 211 109.8 147 21.78 32.8 1 97 99
1997 219 111.6 153 23.41 27.0 1 98 99
1998 234 117.4 138 22.46 1 99 100
1999 15.22  2   97   99 
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Annex table a-3.
Public irrigation investments by type of investment and the GDP implicit deflator for construction,
1948-96, Sri Lanka.
a
         Current prices          GDP 1995 constant prices
New Rehabili- O&M Total deflator New Rehabili- O&M Total
con- tation con- tation  
struction        struction
Rs million 1995 = 100              Rs million
1948 16.1 0 2.0 18.1 0.022 734 0 93 827
1949 40.7 0 2.1 42.8 0.022 1,859 0 97 1,956
1950 60.1 0 2.0 62.1 0.023 2,571 0 86 2,656
1951 72.9 0 2.1 75.1 0.024 3,041 0 89 3,130
1952 101.3 0 2.5 103.7 0.024 4,144 0 102 4,246
1953 76.3 0 2.2 78.5 0.024 3,133 0 89 3,223
1954 47.6 0 2.4 50.0 0.024 1,965 0 98 2,063
1955 60.0 0 2.5 62.5 0.024 2,489 0 103 2,592
1956 50.8 0 3.0 53.8 0.024 2,159 0 127 2,287
1957 53.0 0 2.8 55.8 0.026 2,043 0 109 2,152
1958 42.0 0 3.0 45.0 0.027 1,566 0 110 1,676
1959 41.8 0 17.2 59.0 0.026 1,627 0 670 2,297
1960 32.8 0 10.0 42.8 0.026 1,270 0 386 1,656
1961 46.0 0 6.2 52.2 0.027 1,726 0 232 1,958
1962 41.2 0 5.0 46.2 0.027 1,524 0 185 1,708
1963 25.5 0 4.5 30.1 0.027 949 0 169 1,117
1964 33.0 0 5.0 37.9 0.028 1,188 0 178 1,366
1965 47.2 0 5.2 52.4 0.028 1,703 0 187 1,890
1966 40.2 0 3.6 43.8 0.028 1,445 0 131 1,576
1967 73.8 0 3.8 77.6 0.028 2,655 0 137 2,793
1968 83.0 0 4.4 87.4 0.029 2,834 0 152 2,986
1969 91.3 0 5.5 96.8 0.032 2,857 0 172 3,030
1970 91.7 0 5.6 97.3 0.033 2,769 0 169 2,938
1971 75.8 0 6.4 82.2 0.035 2,160 0 181 2,340
1972 77.0 0 11.7 88.7 0.036 2,128 0 325 2,453
1973 134.0 0 12.7 146.7 0.040 3,357 0 318 3,674
1974 104.8 0 14.7 119.5 0.047 2,230 0 312 2,542
1975 155.8 0 17.4 173.2 0.052 2,999 0 336 3,335
1976 175.9 0.4 17.7 194.0 0.056 3,126 7 315 3,448
1977 158.0 3.8 21.3 183.1 0.061 2,607 63 351 3,021
1978 387.2 11.3 22.8 421.2 0.082 4,725 138 278 5,140
1979 726.1 19.3 42.4 787.8 0.111 6,543 173 382 7,098
1980 987.1 59.9 70.8 1117.9 0.172 5,724 347 411 6,482
1981 2,269.5 312.4 78.3 2,660.2 0.224 10,124 1,394 349 11,867
1982 3,034.0 218.5 89.3 3,341.7 0.260 11,663 840 343 12,846
1983 2,928.7 332.5 110.5 3,371.7 0.317 9,229 1,048 348 10,625
1984 2,842.7 266.3 142.7 3,251.7 0.362 7,849 735 394 8,978
1985 2,766.3 412.9 138.3 3,317.5 0.375 7,373 1,100 369 8,842
1986 2,100.9 524.3 169.1 2,794.3 0.390 5,391 1,345 434 7,170
1987 2,312.1 634.5 177.1 3,123.6 0.406 5,692 1,562 436 7,69038
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         Current prices          GDP 1995 constant prices
New Rehabili- O&M Total deflator New Rehabili- O&M Total
con- tation con- tation  
struction        struction
Rs million 1995=100              Rs million
1988 1,600.8 322.3 130.7 2,053.9 0.459 3,485 702 285 4,472
1989 1,009.4 288.9 174.5 1,472.8 0.530 1,906 546 330 2,781
1990 522.9 341.3 149.3 1,013.6 0.640 818 534 233 1,585
1991 684.9 207.5 167.7 1,060.1 0.707 969 294 237 1,500
1992 1,120.2 384.4 189.3 1,693.9 0.759 1,476 507 249 2,232
1993 968.3 306.9 276.1 1,551.2 0.816 1,187 376 338 1,901
1994 561.8 441.2 248.0 1,251.0 0.904 621 488 274 1,383
1995 528.0 382.5 302.0 1,212.5 1.000 528 383 302 1,212
1996 477.7 772.0 308.1 1,557.7 1.122 426 688 275 1,388
1997 848.0 1,376 273.0 2,497.0 1.220 695 1,128 224 2,047
1998 977.5 2,048 314.9 3,340.2 1.322 739 1,549 238 2,526
1999 990.5 1,179 333.2  2,503.0  1.380 718 854 241 1,813
Note: For a compilation of data sources, see Aluwihare and Kikuchi 1991).39
Annex table a-4.
Selected new irrigation construction projects used in the cost-benefit analysis.
Schemes Year Construction Year Com- Average Construction Costc
com com- settlement mand gestation (current (1995
menced pleted com- areaa periodb prices) constant
   menced    prices)
ha years Rs 1000/ha
Muhathan Kulam 52 57 54 324 4.5 0.93 38.5
Dewahuwa 47 58 49 946 9.6 3.28 135.0
Huruluwewa 49 59 52 3,515 6.8 2.73 100.8
Katupotha 53 59 55 202 5.2 7.92 294.0
Kandalama Tank 52 60 55 842 6.3 5.11 197.8
Periya Madu 52 60 56 304 5.4 3.29 125.5
Chemamadu 54 60 57 243 3.8 1.24 53.1
Parakrama Samudra 46 61 50 7,368 11.0 1.47 58.8
Badagiriya 52 61 57 486 6.0 3.29 121.9
Hattota Amuna 52 61 58 202 5.9 2.97 111.1
Thannimurappu 52 61 56 957 5.5 1.96 52.3
Horiwila 54 61 57 206 5.6 0.97 41.3
Mapakada Wewa 52 62 55 374 6.0 6.95 265.3
Akkarayan Kulam 52 62 62 1,215 6.1 1.40 5.4
Handapangala Wewa 53 62 57 405 5.6 2.96 113.4
Kalmadu Kulam 53 62 57 182 6.0 1.65 57.2
Mahawillachciya 55 62 55 1,079 5.3 4.82 182.2
Gal Oya 49 65 52 37,760 12.0 3.82 148.8
Diul Wewa 53 65 58 162 7.6 3.09 103.7
Pavatkulam 58 65 57 1,674 8.4 3.58 136.2
Usgala Siyambalngamuwa56 65 58 636 5.8 4.87 177.3
Mahakandarawa 57 65 61 2,429 4.6 3.75 142.9
Mora Wewa 56 65 60 1,215 4.9 3.46 130.3
Karawita Yoda Ela 56 66 60 444 6.9 2.93 109.0
Ettimole Wewa 56 66 57 405 6.0 6.17 228.6
Padaviya 53 67 57 5,263 9.4 3.00 114.2
Kimbulwana 53 67 55 560 10.6 2.68 100.1
Vavunikulam 54 67 59 2,429 8.3 2.31 86.2
Hakwatuna 56 67 62 1,741 6.0 4.71 177.6
Kaudulla 59 67 66 1,862 6.4 3.17 121.1
Kurai 57 69 62 215 7.6 3.26 121.1
Mahatotilla 60 69 64 283 6.5 2.47 90.1
Muthuiyankaddu Kulama 58 70 68 2,429 4.7 3.95 123.9
Visvamadukulam 60 71 64 327 4.8 4.89 157.5
Ambelaperumal 60 72 65 252 6.4 6.35 212.2
Koddal Kaddina 61 72 65 162 6.9 3.09 97.0
Kariyali Nagapanduwa 60 72 63 608 7.8 3.78 130.9
Vdayarkaddu Kulam 63 73 63 486 6.8 2.88 96.5
Muruthawela 67 73 68 1,310 4.2 10.99 332.0
Rajangana 57 73 57 5,523 8.8 5.81 203.2
Nagadeepa 67 73 68 1,619 4.4 8.34 256.3
Pimburattawa 69 75 68 1,619 4.2 7.60 141.1
Wahalkada 73 79 74 810 4.2 24.07 362.0
Continued40
a) The command area just after the completion of the projects.
b) Average gestation period of the capital investments obtained as the weighted average of gestation years of the investments in each year
during the construction period, using the value of the investment in constant prices as weights.
c) Include capital expenditures related to irrigation infrastructure development.  Costs related to settlement, supervision and general admin
istration are, in principle, not included.
Sources:  See Aluwihare and Kikuchi (1991), except for Mahaweli C (Zone 3-6), for which data are from World Bank 1993.
Annex table a-4, continued.
Schemes Year Construction Year Com- Average Construction Costc
com- com- settlement mand gestation (current (1995
menced pleted com- areaa periodb prices) constant
   menced    prices)
ha years Rs 1000/ha
Uda Walawe 64 81 64 17,600 12.0 11.85 334.8
Mahadivulwewa 76 82 80 486 3.6 69.14 484.7
Muthukandiya 79 83 80 810 4.2 76.30 462.1
Inginimitiya 79 87 81 2,644 5.1 130.41 433.1
Kirindioya Phase 1 78 88 86 8,951 5.9 142.22 472.4
Mahaweli C (Zone 1-2) 78 90 80 7,300 6.0 172.35 515.0











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Number of and investments by farmers on agro-wells and irrigation pumps in irrigation schemes in the
dry zone of Sri Lanka, 1966-2000.
a
a For details in the estimation see Kikuchi et al. (2001).
Number (1,000 units) Investment (Rs million in 1995 prices)
Lined Unlined Tube- Pumps Wells Pumps Total
dug- dug- well
 well well         
1965 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3
1966 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
1967 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4
1968 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.6
1969 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.6
1970 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 2.3 2.3
1971 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 4.4 4.4
1972 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 10.1 10.1
1973 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 12.3 12.3
1974 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 14.6 14.6
1975 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.2 22.2 22.4
1976 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.2 19.4 19.6
1977 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.1 0.2 22.5 22.6
1978 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.9 0.2 21.8 21.9
1979 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 0.2 22.3 22.5
1980 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.7 0.2 25.8 26.0
1981 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.9 0.2 30.1 30.3
1982 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.2 0.2 35.1 35.3
1983 0.0 0.0 0.1 10.7 0.3 41.4 41.7
1984 0.1 0.0 0.1 12.7 4.1 53.3 57.4
1985 0.4 0.0 0.1 15.2 24.2 66.7 90.8
1986 0.7 0.0 0.2 18.0 16.2 72.1 88.3
1987 1.0 0.0 0.2 21.0 22.1 81.5 103.6
1988 1.5 0.0 0.3 24.5 35.0 93.4 128.4
1989 2.4 0.0 0.4 28.6 64.9 108.2 173.1
1990 4.8 0.1 0.5 34.5 158.5 159.2 317.7
1991 6.2 0.3 0.8 40.2 102.7 149.6 252.4
1992 7.9 0.5 1.2 46.2 113.0 161.0 274.1
1993 10.0 0.9 1.7 53.0 148.8 181.5 330.4
1994 11.8 1.5 2.4 60.2 129.1 192.0 321.1
1995 13.9 2.1 3.2 67.8 152.1 201.4 353.5
1996 16.4 3.0 4.2 76.0 176.2 219.4 395.6
1997 20.0 4.0 5.4 83.4 255.4 198.1 453.5
1998 24.0 5.2 6.7 90.7 283.8 193.9 477.7
1999 28.1 6.5 8.1 98.5 290.7 206.0 496.7



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Annex B—Estimation of Rice Fertilizer Response Functions Annex B—Estimation of Rice Fertilizer Response Functions Annex B—Estimation of Rice Fertilizer Response Functions Annex B—Estimation of Rice Fertilizer Response Functions Annex B—Estimation of Rice Fertilizer Response Functions
As a basis for estimating the benefit of
irrigation investments, we re-estimated rice
fertilizer response functions for different variety
groups using the data presented in Kikuchi and
Aluwihare (1990).  The re-estimation was
attempted partly because the previous
estimation of the functions at experimental
fields was constrained by a limitation of the
computer software then used and partly
because changes in rice production during the
last decade necessitate some adjustment of the
functions at farm level.
Response functions at experimental fields: Response functions at experimental fields: Response functions at experimental fields: Response functions at experimental fields: Response functions at experimental fields:
The estimation results of the response function
of quadratic form using experiment data are
presented in Appendix table b-1.  In addition to
season and growth duration dummies, intercept
dummies are introduced to control differences
among experiments.  The results are essentially
the same as the previous estimation for all
variety types, except for the following points.
First, the statistical fitting is far better than the
previous estimation for all variety types.  With
significant improvements in the coefficient of
determination, the quadratic nature of nitrogen
response of rice yield is much clearer in the
new estimation than the old one.  Second, both
the season and growth duration dummies are
highly significant: rice yield in yala season is
higher than in maha season and long-duration
varieties yield better than short-duration
varieties.  At farm level, no significant yield
difference has been observed between maha
and yala seasons since the time of TVs.  This
may be explained by the tendency that farmers
plant long-duration varieties in maha season and
short-duration varieties in yala season.  It is
difficult to examine if this is the case, since
available data on varieties do not give
information beyond the TV-OIV-NIV distinction.
In this study, we adopt a response function for
each variety group not distinguishing the
seasons.
Response functions at farm level: Response functions at farm level: Response functions at farm level: Response functions at farm level: Response functions at farm level: The fertilizer
response functions at experimental field level are
adjusted down to the farm level.  Based on the
estimate by Jayawardena et al. (1983) on the
yield gap between research stations and farmers’
fields, the response functions of TV and OIV in
table b-1 are adjusted down vertically by 40%,
including the average intercept, to arrive at the
farm level functions under irrigated condition.  In
the case of NIV, the adjustment coefficient of
30% is adopted taking into account
improvements in farmers’ technology level in the
last decade.  The rice fertilizer response
functions under irrigated condition thus estimated
are as follows:
Traditional varieties (TV)
Y = 1600 + 10 N – 0.09 N
2
Old improved varieties (OIV)
Y = 1900 + 14 N – 0.06 N
2
New improved varieties (NIV)
Y = 2800 + 25 N – 0.08 N
2
where Y = rice yield (kg/ha) and N = nitrogen
input (kg/ha).46
a
The fertilizer response function of the following quadratic form: Y = a + bN -cN
2
, where Y=rice yield (kg/ha) and N=nitrogen input (kg/ha).
Figures in parenthesis are t-ratio.
b
Season dummy; maha=0 and yala=1.
c
Growth duration dummy; short-duration (3-3.5 months)=0 and long-duration   (4 months or longer)=1.
d Differences among experiments are controlled by intercept dummies.
Source: Original data from Kikuchi and Aluwihare (1990).
Annex table b-1.





N 15.8 23.7 32.5
(4.360) (13.892) (21.706)
N2 -0.111 -0.095 -0.110
(2.243) (5.493) (10.256)
Seasonb 1286 1819 1536
(7.972) (8.992) (5.870)
Growth durationc - 1384 1858
- (4.139) (7.100)
Intercept (average of all experiments) 2714 3215 3990
Adj. R2 0.796 0.922 0.932
Degree of Freedom 38 136 211
Number of dummy variables includedd 16 60 6947
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